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I. Dear Akhil,
It is certainly not surprising that America 's Unwritten Constitution is
remarkably stimulating, informative, and challenging. You are surely correct
that one cannot possibly understand the American constitutional system
simply by reading the text of the Constitution (or, for that matter, reading
decisions of the judiciary ostensibly "interpreting" the text). Instead, one
must not only look at long-established American practices but also at social
movements and transcendent moments in American history-the Gettysburg
Address and Martin Luther King's "Dream" speech are two that you
emphasize'-that have provided the rationales for how we understand those
practices (and, on occasion, become willing to transform them). Your
Constitution is necessarily a "living Constitution," for the American people,
as active agents of their own constitutional destinies, are constantly debating
one another about what constitutes its deep meanings; they constantly create
new movements, which in turn generate new political leaders committed to
particular understandings. This is one way of understanding not only the
civil rights movement that is so important to both of us, but also the Tea
Party, which cannot be understood without paying careful attention to its
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narratives of the Constitution and calls both for fidelity to its ostensible
norms and for amendments, such as repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment, 2
that would return the Constitution to its intended-and they argue better-
embrace of a far stronger form of federalism than we in fact have today.
It is also not surprising that we continue to have some quite fundamental
disagreements, whatever our personal closeness. Each of us recognizes in his
respective acknowledgments the importance of our relationship over what is
now more than a quarter century, which includes for the last decade our
service as co-editors of a casebook in constitutional law, Processes of
Constitutional Decisionmaking.4 But that does not mean, of course, that we
have become clones of one another. We met initially when you came to
Austin for a symposium on Philip Bobbitt's then recently published
Constitutional Fate,5 and we bonded during the course of what turned out to
be (at least) a two-hour visit to the monument to Confederate war dead in
front of the Texas State Capitol. As noted in our casebook, that monument
presents what might be described as the "standard" Southern view of the
War:
DIED FOR STATE RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.
THE PEOPLE OF THE SOUTH, ANIMATED BY THE SPIRIT OF
1776, TO PRESERVE THEIR RIGHTS, WITHDREW FROM THE
FEDERAL COMPACT IN 1861. THE NORTH RESORTED TO
COERCION. THE SOUTH, AGAINST OVERWHELMING
NUMBERS AND RESOURCES, FOUGHT UNTIL EXHAUSTED.
We debated at length whether this is a "possible" interpretation of the
War in relation to the Constitution, which is a very different question from
whether it is the "best" interpretation. Your view, I think it is safe to say, is
that this does not rise to the level of a "possible" interpretation-that it would
deserve an "F" if submitted on a final examination. My view was that it is,
for better or worse, a possible view, because the 1787 Constitution, correctly
interpreted, is ambiguous (or, in the language of the 1980s, when we first
met, "indeterminate"). In the interim, neither of us has changed our
fundamental view.
Thus I was startled (though I should not have been surprised) to see
your declaration that "the original Constitution emphatically denied state
2. See Matt Bai, Tea Party's Push on Senate Election Exposes Limits, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/us/politics/02bai.html (discussing Tea Party movement
members in several states calling for repeal of the Amendment).
3. AMAR, supra note 1, at 597; SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA'S 51 CONSTITUTIONS
AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 399 (2012).
4. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (2006).
5. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
6. BREST ET AL., supra note 4, at 219.
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authority to unilaterally secede."' As many times as I have read the
Constitution, I quite literally don't see this "emphatic[] deni[al]." At most, I
see an aspiration, set out in the Preamble, which both you and I admire
greatly, that the new Constitution would indeed be the instrument creating a
"Perfect Union." For me, the Preamble is the equivalent of the hope
announced during a traditional wedding ceremony-admittedly in the form
of a promise-that this union will last forever, until death separates the two
partners. What this means, however, in both written and unwritten American
legal culture, is only that one hopes that the marriage will generate a truly
lasting commitment because of mutual appreciation of what marriage brings;
however, in the not-unlikely circumstance that that won't actually happen,
then divorce, amicable or otherwise, is a possibility. Everyone, whether
those at the altar or the onlooking audience, knows this.
Lincoln, unequivocally one of your heroes, offered a mocking response
to those defending the legitimacy of secession: "In their view, the Union, as a
family relation, would not be anything like a regular marriage at all, but only
as a sort of free-love arrangement [laughter] to be maintained on what that
sect calls passionate attraction." Unlike Lincoln's audience, I don't view
this as a laughing matter. After all, consider a sentence that appeared in the
penultimate paragraph of the penultimate draft of the Declaration of
Independence, where Thomas Jefferson noted the British misconduct served
to generate "the last stab to agonizing affection," so that "manly spirit bids us
to renounce forever these unfeeling brethren."9 The affection necessary to
maintain political unity, especially in a federal political system that can be
understood only against the background of dissensus and potential for
"disaffection," can never be taken entirely for granted. Such dissensus had
made a truly unified government-or even the more truly centralized system
that James Madison in fact yearned for in Philadelphia and was, to his
chagrin, systematically denied by his fellow delegates-impossible. We
were a "house divided," and it was the perhaps dubious premise of the 1787
Constitution that it was building a structure that would enable such a house to
stand instead of inevitably imitating the House of Atreus by generating a
tragic and bloody carnage.1o
7. AMAR, supra note 1, at 85.
8. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Speech at Indianapolis, Indiana (Feb. 11, 1861), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 201, 202 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
9. DRAFT OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 34 (U.S. 1776), available at
http://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/transcript-declaration-independence-rough-draft.
10. The Greek myth of the cursed family follows the descendants of Atreus, who served King
Thyestes his murdered sons for dinner. Atreus's son Agamemnon continues the slaughter when he
sacrifices his daughter Iphigenia to further the Trojan War. Agamemnon's wife Clytemnestra
avenges Iphigenia by murdering Agamemnon with the help of her lover Aegisthus, who is
Thyestes's surviving son. Agamemnon's son Orestes concludes the legend when he kills
Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. Helene P. Foley, Introduction to AESCHYLUS, THE ORESTIA, at vi, vii
(Peter Meineck trans., Hackette Pub. Co. 1998).
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You have written with true eloquence, both in this book and in your
earlier "biography" of the Constitution," of the ravages generated by the
"rotten compromise," in the words of Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit,
that entrenched slavery and made us, in the title of Don Fehrenbacher's last
work, a "slaveholding republic."l 2 We'll never know, of course, whether
Romeo and Juliet, had they lived, could have successfully surmounted the
bitter divisions between the Capulets and Montagues. We do know that this
proved unsuccessful, as an empirical matter, with regard to the "free North"
and the slaveholding South. And both sides claimed constitutional support,
including, inevitably, the support of America's unwritten norms. One might
well perceive one of those norms as a willingness to engage in bisectional
compromise-think of the Missouri Compromise or the Compromise of
1850. Both, not at all coincidentally, involved the issue triggered by what I
suspect both of us view as the most important constitutional event of 1803,
the Louisiana Purchase (far more important than Marbury)13 : Would
slaveowners be welcome in the vast new territories that constituted the reality
of American expansionism (a topic, I should note, that does not garner
extensive discussion in your book)? There is a reason that Justice Catron, in
his concurrence in Dred Scott 4 (reprinted, I think uniquely, in our casebook)
could claim that the basic premise of "EQUALITY" (as he spelled it)
guaranteed that slaveowners would have the same ability to take their legal
property, as defined by state law, into the territories operated by a fiduciary
Congress in the equal interest of all citizens.' 5
Perhaps the greatest difference between us is that I basically accept in a
way that you do not William Lloyd Garrison's view of the 1787 Constitution
as a "Covenant with Death and an Agreement with Hell."' 6 Pacts with the
Devil make their own claim to "honorable" lawyers of the Marshallian
persuasion; he insisted, after all, on separating the role of the "jurist" from
that of the "moralist," a distinction repeated, of course, by his successor
Roger Taney in Dred Scott.'7 Garrison notably burnt the Constitution and,
indeed, suggested that there should be "No Union with Slaveowners."
Imagine for a moment that he was actually successful in generating a
secessionist movement within New England, so that the six New England
I1. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005).
12. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 43-44 (quoting AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISES AND
ROTTEN COMPROMISES (2010)); see also DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC:
AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (2002).
13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
14. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
15. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 529 (Catron, J., concurring); BREST ET AL., supra note 4, at 248-49.
16. Resolution Adopted by the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society (Jan. 27, 1843) (quoted in
The "Covenant with Death, " LIBERATOR, Mar. 13, 1863, at 1, col. 3).
17. The classic formulation of this distinction appears in Marshall's opinion in The Antelope, 23
U.S. 66, 121 (1825): "Whatever might be the answer of a moralist to this question, a jurist must
search for its legal solution . . . ."
18. BREST ET AL., supra note 4, at 253.
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states tried to secede on antislavery grounds. Would you have supported
James K. Polk or Franklin Pierce if they sent troops to prevent secession and
preserve the Union and, if so, why? Is your opposition to secession within
the United States simply positivistic-i.e., it is, you believe, the unequivocal
command of the Constitution that any faithful constitutionalist must adhere
to-or does it rest on a stronger moral principle? One such principle, of
course, is antislavery, and one might support the War as basically a
"humanitarian intervention" by which the slaveowners' regimes would be
transformed. But if that is the basis for one's support, then the operative
principle is surely not "secessionist movements are always to be opposed,
wherever and whenever they occur."
Both of us agree that the Constitution was far better after the slaughter
of War and the addition of the "Reconstruction Amendments." One of your
most striking chapters is the defense of the Fourteenth Amendment-and the
Military Reconstruction necessary to realize its ratification-as Congress
simply acting under its power to guarantee to the states a "Republican Form
of Government."19 Your chapter is eloquent and incisive. I certainly find it a
"possible" view of the Guarantee Clause, 20 even as one must recognize that
such a strong reading of the Guarantee Clause by Congress is quite literally
unique, both unprecedented prior to 1866 and left untapped since then as a
defense for subsequent congressional actions regarding state governments. I
continue to accept Bruce Ackerman's view of the Amendment as a basically
extra-constitutional addition, the extra-constitutionality being necessary
because of the truly egregious Article V and its setting of basically
insurmountable hurdles to those striving for fundamental change.21
But even if the Constitution is decidedly better after the Reconstruction
Amendments, whatever their provenance, for me it is not sufficiently better
to warrant the love you so movingly display for the Constitution. And, as
you well know, what has generated my deep alienation from the Constitution
has almost literally nothing to do with the Reconstruction Amendments or,
for that matter, the doctrinal Constitution as enunciated by the judiciary and
others, but instead, the fundamental institutional structures established in
1787 and left remarkably unchanged since then. What most disappoints me
about your new book is your confidence that clever lawyering can provide
adequate "workarounds" to what you so obviously believe yourself to be real
problems. At one level, you might be right: Should the general public be
convinced that the unamended Constitution is taking us over a cliff, as I
sometimes believe to be the case, it might well accept the determination of a
clever lawyer that we can avoid that fate.
The problem, though, is that a dreadful part of our "unwritten
Constitution" is that it should be treated as a basically sacred document and
19. AMAR, supra note 1, at ch. 2.
20. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 4.
21. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS, 99-119 (1998).
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thus subjected to little, if any, radical criticism. I don't think this can be
traced in any uncomplicated way to 1787 itself, save for Madison's hope,
expressed in Federalist No. 49, that the Constitution be treated as an object
of reverence and "venerat[ed]" rather than coldly analyzed.2 2 A century ago,
when Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt ran against each other (and
William Howard Taft) for the presidency, they both were more than willing
to offer fundamental critiques of constitutional practices and norms. 23 My
own view is that one of the consequences of World War II was an
unwarranted faith in the Constitution as the unquestioned symbol of what we
were fighting for. Even though (should it be because of?) both of the
candidates in 2012 were graduates of the Harvard Law School, we received
not one moment of serious discussion of the adequacy of the Constitution
from either of them. Of course, Yale Law School-educated Bill Clinton was
no better. Since neither of us is truly complacent about the American polity,
we might wonder whether this contemporary silence has anything to do with
the way constitutional law is taught at our leading law schools.
Along with reading your undoubtedly lively responses to my arguments
above, I hope you write as well of what changes you would like to see in
what might be termed the pedagogy of the Constitution. Both of us, in recent
years, have been teaching undergraduates as well as fledgling lawyers. Both
of us, I have no doubt, hope to reach a wide audience of our fellow citizens.
But I am curious which, as between law schools and undergraduate classes,
you expect to be the actual venue for reading and confronting your always
imaginative takes on the Constitution. If, as I suspect, the answer is the
latter, then how would you change the culture of the legal academy to make
it more receptive to your distinctive way of approaching the Constitution?
In friendship and fondness,
Sandy
II. Dear Sandy,
It is great to be back in conversation with you-this time, about your
new book and mine. By highlighting the classic constitutional question of
secession in your opening missive to me, you have chosen a great place to
begin our epistolary exchange-namely, at the beginning. Not just at the
beginning of our quarter-century friendship, which did indeed start with an
intense and extended debate over the Confederacy's legal theory, but also at
the beginning of our Constitution's text and history. For (as you know) I
believe that the secession issue is powerfully illuminated by the
Constitution's opening sentence (A.K.A. the Preamble) and also by the epic
22. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 311 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
23. Sanford Levinson, Our Imbecilic Constitution, CAMPAIGN STOPS, N.Y. TIMES (MAY 28,
2012, 8:36 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/our-imbecilic-constitution/.
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yearlong continental conversation in 1787-1788 that accompanied the
Constitution's ratification.
Let me first summarize my legal reasoning, and then step back and
discuss some of the implications of this reasoning-what this reasoning says
about the similarities and the differences between your approach and mine, in
our two new books and elsewhere.
The terse text that we call the Constitution begins, in its opening
sentence, by calling itself a "Constitution." 24  Not a "league," not a
"confederacy" or a "confederation," nor a treaty based on states that retain
their full "sovereignty" and "independence"-highly significant legal
keywords that were all prominently featured in the opening passages of a
predecessor document, the 1781 "Articles of Confederation,",25 that the
1787-1788 document aimed to wholly displace. In lieu of the old 1781
compact/league/treaty/confederation, what was instead being offered up to
the American people in 1787-1788 was made clear by the new document's
opening words: a "Constitution" obviously modeled on the extant state
constitutions. The literally primary purpose of this 1787-1788 document
was to form a "more perfect" union-one that would safeguard "common
defence" and thereby preserve "the Blessings of Liberty."2
The terse text's penultimate section, Article VI, explains quite clearly
what the legal status of "this Constitution" would be, once ratified.27 The
text was to be-and has legally always remained-"the supreme Law of the
Land." 2 8 The Articles of Confederation had never described themselves as
"law," much less as supreme law. Nowhere was the old "Congress" under
the Articles described as a "legislature" or a "lawmaker," and this old body
in fact was more of an international assembly/war council on the model of
today's NATO Council and UN Security Council. Under the Articles of
Confederation, state officials were not obliged by oath to treat the Articles
themselves or congressional edicts pursuant to the Articles as supreme
domestic law trumping the contrary commands of state legislatures (which
were in fact described by the Articles as "legislatures" and whose commands
were thus seen by that 1781 document as true laws).
In emphatic and unambiguous contrast, the 1787-1788 Constitution
makes clear that all state officials are indeed oath bound to follow the
Constitution as supreme law,30 and further makes clear that nothing that a
state does unilaterally-nothing in any future state constitution or state
24. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
25. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, arts. 1, 11, 111, IV.
26. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
27. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
29. See AMAR, supra note II, at 40-41, 64-65, 301 (describing the relationship between state
legislatures and federal law under the Articles).
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 3.
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statute--can change the hierarchical status of the U.S. Constitution and
federal statutes and treaties pursuant to that Constitution as the supreme law
of the land.3 Period. No ifs, ands, or buts. Disgruntled individuals are
always free to leave, but the land remains as part of America, and the
supreme law that governs that land is the U.S. Constitution
"notwithstanding" any "Contrary" unilateral state action.32 Unilateral state
secession is simply not provided for, and indeed is emphatically ruled out.
(If a state did actually retain a right to unilaterally exit, surely we would
expect to see all sorts of rules about how that could happen-for example,
how a departing state would need to shoulder its fair share of the pre-existing
national debt and guarantee peace with neighboring union states. But we
don't see any of that stuff in the text because, to repeat, unilateral state
secession is not allowed by the Constitution, which makes itself supreme
regardless of what individuals within an individual state might say or do.)
As I sometimes say to my kids, "What part of 'No!' did you not understand?"
Sandy, it's just that simple, textually.
But of course there is far, far-far!-more legal evidence than this, and
I spent some thirty pages in the opening chapter of my 2005 book (America's
Constitution: A Biography-the predecessor to my latest volume, America's
Unwritten Constitution) laying out this evidence.33  Just a few highlights.
Article III explicitly says that anyone who wages war against the Union
commits "Treason," even if that individual is supported by, and supportive
of, his anti-Union state government.34 When Antifederalist Luther Martin
explicitly objected to precisely this result at Philadelphia, he was pointedly
outvoted-and in the ratification conversation he brought the issue
prominently to the attention of his fellow Americans, who once again
outvoted him by ratifying the clear antisecession rules of Article III and the
document as a whole.35 Article VII made clear that no state could be bound
by the new Constitution unless it chose to sign on: Precisely because each
state was indeed sovereign and independent prior to 1787, no state could bind
any other. But in obvious and unmistakable contrast, Article V made clear
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
32. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
33. See AMAR, supra note I1, at 5-39 (deducing from a variety of textual differences that the
Articles allowed for unilateral secession as part of each State's sovereignty and that the Constitution
disavowed this as a failure of the Articles).
34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; see also AMAR, supra note 11, at 242-45 (discussing the Treason
Clause and the debates surrounding its ratification).
35. AMAR, supra note 11, at 242.
36. See U.S. CONST. art. VII ("The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between States so ratifying the Same."); see
also AMAR, supra note 11, at 34-35 ("Article V1l made it clear that the people of [a non-ratifying]
state were a distinct sovereign entity free to vote down the new Constitution and ignore it."). But cf
Donald S. Lutz, Constitutional Bricolage?: A Commentary on Akhil Reed Amar's America's
Constitution: A Biography, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 311, 314 (2007) ("[Amar's] use of Article VII is
imaginative and probably correct, but this and other pieces of evidence are trotted out repeatedly in
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that once a state joined the new union, it could indeed be bound by future
constitutional amendments agreed to by the conventions of enough other
states, even if its own state convention voted against these future
amendments. The clear structural logic here, reinforcing text and history, is
that a state would no longer be fully sovereign once it chose to join the new
Constitution. And without full state sovereignty, secession as a legal,
constitutional right simply has no leg to stand on.3
Now turn briefly to consider the epic continental conversation that
accompanied the Constitution's ratification. At Philadelphia, James Madison
clearly said that while a sovereign state might secede from a
treaty/league/confederation if the sovereign state deemed the treaty to have
been breached or to threaten its sovereign existence, no such secession was
permitted by nonsovereign subparts within a true legal "Constitution"--e.g.,
cities or counties within a state, or states within the proposed federal
Constitution. Madison here invoked the famed British legal authority
Blackstone, whose bestselling treatise had clearly explained that the 1707
union of Scotland and England forbade unilateral secession of either part.40
In Federalist No. 5, Publius made clear that this indivisible 1707 union was
indeed the precise model for what was now being proposed four score years
later in America.4 1 Indeed, Publius explicitly linked the words of the
Preamble about the formation of a "more perfect union" with the language
different combinations willy nilly, and some ... leave this reader less willing to buy other pieces of
evidence at face value.").
37. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring only two-thirds of the States to call a constitutional
convention and only three-fourths of the states' approval to bind all the states under a constitutional
amendment).
38. Two sidenotes: First, the natural right to revolt in case of true tyranny might remain as a
right above all law, but this right has nothing to do with whether there happens to exist majoritarian
electoral support within the boundaries of any particular state. In any event, Jeff Davis and
company were never able to point to anything truly tyrannical justifying their treason. These rebels
purported to secede before Lincoln had even taken office; Lincoln in 1860 had scrupulously played
by the rules in winning election; so had congressional Republicans; courts remained open to hear
valid legal disputes; and anti-Lincoln forces had full freedom of speech-even as they denied that
freedom to others, and indeed made a mockery of the natural rights of Southern slaves and violated
many legal rights of pro-Lincoln citizens in the South, citizens who were legally entitled to all the
protections of the U.S. Constitution, including the right to have their land governed by that
Constitution rather than by those aiming to overturn binding law and valid continental elections by
force of arms.
Second, even though a state may not unilaterally secede, the Union itself might lawfully
decide to dissolve via various legal federal procedures provided for by the text itself-constitutional
amendments, federal statutes, federal treaties, even federal presidential elections. But all of these
procedures would involve democratic decision making by the Union as a whole and not unilateral
decision making merely by one geographical part of the Union called a "state."
39. AMAR, supra note 11, at 31.
40. See id. at 30-32, 36 (summarizing Blackstone's argument and crediting it as the source for
Madison's own "breached treaty defense").
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 5 (John Jay), supra note 22, at 44-45, 48; AMAR, supra note 11, at
36.
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that had accompanied the 1707 unification of the British isle.42 In Federalist
No. 11, Publius explicitly described the Constitution's proposed union as
"strict and indissoluble," and indeed the entire opening section of the
Federalist Papers-encompassing Numbers 2 through 9-was premised on
the need for an indivisible American union on the 1707 English-Scotch
model.43 Only if internal land borders were demilitarized could Americans
prevent states from warring against each other and keep Europe from playing
divide and conquer in the New World. Unilateral secession was wholly
inconsistent with the main structural argument for union sketched out in
these essays.
And this argument was raised not just in these essays, but in the
ratification conversations themselves, where leading Federalists repeatedly
said that the new union would not permit unilateral secession.44 As I explain
in my book, "[James] Wilson contrasted traditional 'confederacies' that
historically 'have all fallen to pieces' with the proposed Constitution, in
which 'the bonds of our union' would be 'indissolubly strong." 4 5 Wilson
himself had emigrated from Scotland, as had North Carolina's Federalist
Governor Samuel Johnston, who could not have been clearer in thought or
expression: "[T]he Constitution must be the supreme law of our land;
otherwise, it would be in the power of any one state to counteract the other
states, and withdraw itself from the Union.'A6
In every state, Antifederalists got the message and loudly warned their
audience that if the Constitution were ratified, their state would lose its
sovereignty and be unable to exit unilaterally. 7 Again and again and again
the Antifederalists said this. Yet never in this entire year long continental
conversation-not once!--did any prominent Federalist say that each state
would indeed have the right to leave if subsequently dissatisfied. Sandy, if
secession was permitted, why didn't the Federalists say so? Surely a money-
back guarantee/right to return the purchase no questions asked would have
been a great selling point if true.
But it was not true, legally. No state ratifying convention explicitly
purported to reserve a right of unilateral secession in the course of approving
the federal Constitution.4 8 And when the unilateral secession issue arose at
42. See THE FEDERALIST No. 5 (John Jay), supra note 22, at 44-45 (praising this element of the
unification); AMAR, supra note 11, at 36 (linking Jay's praise of this language to the Preamble).
43. AMAR, supra note 11, at 36.
44. See id. at 34-37 (recounting the Federalists' comments relevant to unilateral secession made
during the ratification debates).
45. Id. at 36-37.
46. Id. at 37.
47. Id. at 38; see also id. at 35 (outlining a number of sovereignty-based criticisms of the
Constitution leveled by Antifederalists).
48. See Kenneth M. Stampp, The Concept of a Perpetual Union, 65 J. AM. HIST. 5, 20 (1978)
("No state convention made the right of secession the subject of extended inquiry. . . ."). But see
AMAR, supra note 11, at 38 n.84 ("[The New York] vote goes unmentioned by the great historian
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the New York ratifying convention, Federalists explicitly rejected the idea,
and did so at the risk of losing the ultimate ratification vote. 4 9 The final
vote-with no secession reservation-was a nailbiter, 30 to 27.0 Had New
York voted no, it is doubtful that the fledgling Constitution would have
actually succeeded without the deep-water ports of New York City and
control over West Point and the mighty Hudson River, the geographic keys
to the continent. In short, when ratification hung in the balance, the
Federalists emphatically rejected the secession idea-at the risk of losing
everything. Alexander Hamilton proclaimed that the plain language of
Article VI "stands in the way" of any subsequent right of unilateral
secession. John Jay pronounced secession rights "inconsistent with the
,,52AnMaConstitution. And Madison penned a letter, read aloud by Hamilton and
later published for the benefit of the entire world (which was in real time
following the New York cliffhanger with rapt attention, in rather the same
way that all eyes are today, as I write these words to you, Sandy, focused on
fiscal-cliff negotiations). Here is what Madison wrote: "[T]he Constitution
requires an adoption in toto, and for ever. It has been so adopted by the other
States."54
OK, now what does all of this mean for our two new books-your new
book, Framed: America's 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance,"
and mine, America's Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles
We Live By -and for constitutional interpretation more generally?
Here are some similarities and differences between you and me. First,
we are both interested in deep and abiding issues of constitutional law,
whether or not they are the hot topics of the moment. Some secessionist
nonsense did bubble up recently, after Obama's reelection,57 but you and I
have been interested in this issue for decades.
Second, you and I both find federalism fascinating-and in particular
both your new book and mine explore ways of thinking about the federal
Constitution alongside state constitutions. Your book showcases state
Kenneth M. Stampp, and surely qualifies his claim that 'no state convention made the right of
secession the subject of extended inquiry."').
49. AMAR, supra note 11, at 38.
50. John P. Kaminski, New York: The Reluctant Pillar, in THE RELUCTANT PILLAR: NEW
YORK AND THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 48, 114 (Stephen L. Schechter ed.,
1985).
51. AMAR, supra note 11, at 38.
52. Id.
53. Id.; Kaminski, supra note 50, at 112-14; cf id. at 100 ("As the delegates converged on
Poughkeepsie, they realized the critical situation of the state and country.").
54. AMAR, supra note 11, at 38.
55. LEVINSON, supra note 3.
56. AMAR, supra note 1.
57. Elizabeth Dias, Obama's Re-Election Inspires Southern Secessionists, SWAMPLAND, TIME




constitutions alongside the federal charter in its very subtitle-America's 51
Constitutions-and my book's concluding chapter features an extended
analysis of the similarities and differences between the one federal
Constitution and the fifty state constitutions.ss The secession question tightly
focuses on the relationship between state and federal constitutions: Can
South Carolina amend its state constitution so as to exit from the U.S.
Constitution? You think this is (or at least was in 1861) an arguable
question. I say (among other things) that precisely because the federal
"Constitution" is explicitly and self-consciously modeled on pre-existing
state constitutions, unilateral secession is impermissible." South Carolina
may not unilaterally secede from the Union, just as Spartanburg County may
not unilaterally secede from South Carolina.
Third, you and I both care deeply about conscience and legal ethics. In
particular, both you and I have written extensively about legal oaths-you in
your first book, Constitutional Faith61 (which I reviewed way back when for
the Texas Law Review ) and I in the penultimate chapter of my new book, a
chapter entitled "Doing the Right Thing: America's Conscientious
Constitution."6 3 Lincoln began his time in office by swearing a solemn legal
oath to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution." 64  Did this oath
oblige him to defend "the land" and to "protect" the Constitution and loyal
Unionists-and there were such men, Sandy!-in the South? Lincoln
thought that his oath did indeed require this, and I think he was plainly
correct. Though I do not agree with all of his legal reasoning, I find his
actions to be profoundly legal and oath observing on the secession
question-perhaps the most momentous question of all of American
constitutional law.
Fourth, and related, both you and I are interested in American
constitutional culture-in what our mutual friend Philip Bobbitt describes as
America's constitutional "ethos"65 and what our mutual co-author Jack
Balkin discusses under the rubric of constitutional "narrative."6  Lincoln of
58. AMAR, supra note 1, at 449-77.
59. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 326-28.
60. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 463-77 (discussing the striking patterns among the states' and
the nation's constitutions).
61. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 54-55, 57, 91-93, 220 n.6 (1988).
62. Akhil Reed Amar, Civil Religion and Its Discontents, 76 TExAS L. REV. 1153 (1989)
(reviewing LEVINSON, supra note 61).
63. AMAR, supra note 1, ch. 10.
64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 8, at 215, 224.
65. BOBBIT, supra note 5, at 94.
66. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 2-3 (2011); see also Stephen M. Griffin, How Do We Redeem the Time?, 91 TEXAS L. REV.
101 (reviewing BALKIN, supra, and contrasting Balkin's take on the constitutional narrative with
the narrative of discontinuity); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the
Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 147 (reviewing BALKIN, supra,
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course is central to our constitutional culture. My 2005 book's opening
chapter ended with extended quotations from Lincoln on the secession
issue, 6 and my new book features Lincoln prominently throughout its twelve
chapters-especially its chapter (Chapter 6, to be specific) on America's
cultural icons and symbols. Lincoln is iconic. So are many of his great
texts-the First and Second Inaugurals, the Gettysburg Address, the
Emancipation Proclamation, and so on. Most of the biggest Supreme Court
cases in any given year pivot on the Fourteenth Amendment, an amendment
that-along with the adjacent Thirteenth and Fifteenth-memorializes the
constitutional vision of Lincoln and his party. My defense of Lincoln aligns
me with this defining national narrative-with America's mainstream culture
and ethos. But if you are right, Sandy, Lincoln was . . . what? A lawless
butcher? A man whose vision in 1861 was no better, legally, than Jeff
Davis's?
In turn, this leads to other differences in temperament between us. You
are more comfortable playing the role of gadfly. I by contrast aim to offer a
more orthodox account-both of what the Constitution rightly read means,
and about the proper rules for reading it.
My 2005 book focused more on what the "right answers" to various
constitutional questions are, and my new book highlights how we go about
finding those right answers. By temperament, you are more agnostic about
just how many right answers there may be, and also more playful about
permissible interpretive methods. But I do share your view that the text of
the Constitution only gets us so far. That is indeed the unifying
methodogical theme of my new book-the need to go beyond text in various
ways, even as we ultimately remain faithful to the text (rightly read). My
antisecession argument is an apt case study. Alongside what the text
explicitly says ("Constitution," "more perfect union," "Treason," "supreme
Law of the Land, notwithstanding" "Contrary" state rules, etc.), I emphasize
many unwritten elements. I highlight what the text pointedly omits and
portentously does not say: "Confederation," "league," state "sovereignty,"
and so on. I highlight not just what Federalists did say in the ratification
conversation, but what they did not say-what they NEVER said, namely
that states would retain a right of unilateral secession. And I tie all these
points together with a structural argument requiring us to read the document
as a whole instrument, centrally aimed at achieving a geostrategic continental
union with defensible borders. The need for structural argumentation-for
reading between the lines of various clauses-is the main theme of the
opening chapter of my new book.69
specifically the issue of whether the Balkin's narrative of progressive constitutional faith can be
reconciled with constitutional fidelity).
67. AMAR, supra note 11, at 51-53.
68. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 17-22.
69. AMAR, supra note 1, at 1-5.
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Which takes me, finally, to the link between the ideas that I sketch out
in the opening chapters of my two most recent books and the ideas about
America's current "crisis" that you present in your new opening chapter. I
have argued that America has been strong and free for most of its history
precisely because the Constitution structured an indivisible geographic union
prohibiting unilateral exit. This union kept states from warring against each
other (about western land) and enabled them to keep Europe from
intermeddling in the American heartland. Liberty thrived because no major
standing army in peacetime was necessary for the first 150 years of our
constitutional existence. Thanks to the Constitution, the Louisiana Purchase,
the Monroe Doctrine, and Manifest Destiny, American liberty was protected
first and foremost by our vast oceanic moats (just as England and Scotland,
once unified, were safe from foreign invasion thanks to the English Channel).
As late as 1945, America benefited from this geostrategic situation. Because
of our wide oceans, only Pearl Harbor was bombed-not New York, or San
Francisco, or Austin. Meanwhile everyone else in the world fought the war
in their own back yards.
Sandy, if the Confederacy had prevailed in the 1860s, heaven help us!
Venturing into counterfactual history/science fiction is always perilous, but
who knows whether the White Supremacists in a Texas-dominated
Confederacy in 1941 would have allied with the USA or with the Nazis? So
I continue to think you were mistaken way back when we first started our
debate-in Austin, in 1986-and I think you continue to misdiagnose
America's constitutional situation today.
You think there is a genuine "crisis" of governance and you tend to
blame the Constitution. I see things differently. First, I don't blame the
Constitution for most of our problems; I blame the fact that too many of our
fellow citizens are kooky-beginning with the Governor of your own state
and with his many admirers in Texas and elsewhere. If a huge proportion of
Americans have outlandish views, there is only so much that constitutional
forms can do. Second, while I admit that foreign parliamentary systems
don't have all the same pathologies as presidentialist models-there is less
gridlock abroad-I think that foreign parliamentary systems have offsetting
pathologies. For example, a plurality party that does not in fact have a
genuine mandate for change and that has never won the considered support
of the median voter70 might nevertheless be able to effect major policy
change-perhaps for the worse. Parliamentary incumbents can manipulate
electoral timing with "snap" elections; and policy can sometimes shift
drastically in the wake of a single low-turnout election.
70. See DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 16-25 (1998)
(explaining the median voter theorem); Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United
States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REv. 1275, 1281 (2005) (noting that the Medium Voter Theorem
states that "if voters have single-peaked preferences in a single-dimensional issue space, then the
position of the median will prevail under majority rule and various voting procedures" (footnotes
omitted)).
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So I think that America's situation is not really more critical than, say,
Greece's or Italy's or Japan's or France's or Britain's. America is no longer
quite the hegemon it was in 1945, but this is because in 1945 America was
the only nation standing (thanks to our geostrategic isolation and unification).
Today, other nations are now back on their feet-and this is a good thing.
Today, many other nations are genuinely democratic-following in
America's footsteps!-and this, too, is a good thing for America and the
world. True, many of these other nations are parliamentary and not
presidential, but both brands of constitutional democracy are viable and
attractive. Other countries have workable multiparty systems, but two
parties, each vying for the median voter, have worked fairly well for America
over the long haul.71 True, America's Constitution is very hard to amend-
but because of this fact, very few bad amendments have prevailed over the
course of history, while many good amendments have ultimately cleared the
bar. Are state constitutions, which are much easier to amend, generally more
functional and more admired by Americans than the federal Constitution?
In short, America is no longer the towering hegemon it was in 1945
because many other countries are beginning to emulate our democratic
system; because many other nations have now thankfully demilitarized; and
because Americans now spend way more than we did prior to 1945 on
national and world defense, and way more than does most of the rest of the
world. Plus, our system is truly continental, which poses unique challenges
and opportunities. Sandy, even if you think Britain has a better constitutional
system than America, does Europe as a whole? C'mon!
In short, Sandy, I am doubtful that there is a genuine crisis in America
that would be solved by major constitutional reform. That said, I actually
agree with many of the specific reform proposals you favor-direct national
election of the President, a less malapportioned Senate, quicker transitions of
power after national elections 7 2-but I frankly don't think any of these
reforms would make a major difference solving America's biggest problems,
problems which are, to repeat, no more daunting than the problems facing
other nations and regions today. And even more happily, some of the
problems that you have identified might be solvable without the need to
formally amend the Constitution, as I have explained in the concluding
chapter of my new book, and elsewhere. Perhaps in our next go-round we
could talk about some of the reforms we would both like to see?
Fondly,
Akhil
71. AMAR, supra note 1, ch. 10.




So what is the key difference between us concerning secession? By and
large, our argument is academic, in both the descriptive and perhaps, for
some, pejorative sense. That is, I think it boils down to whether the
argument for secession-what you call "unilateral withdrawal" from the
Union-is "frivolous," in the sense that no reasonable lawyer could possibly
present the argument and, indeed, it would merit sanctions under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure73 if (s)he did so to a federal court. I
continue to think that the answer is no, even if I certainly agree with you that
almost all contemporary lawyers may well see no merit at all in such a claim
and even, more controversially, that most lawyers in 1860 would have been
equally dismissive. I once wrote an article on "frivolous cases," 74 not least
because at that time I was teaching "professional responsibility"; one of the
most important questions, both practically and jurisprudentially, facing any
lawyer is whether there are indeed professional, and not only prudential,
limits on what they can argue. Frank Easterbrook, both then and now a
distinguished judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (and, of course,
a member of the University of Chicago Law School faculty as well),
proffered the notion that "frivolousness" required near-unanimous rejection
by the professional community of lawyers.7 ' To adopt the language of our
friends Stanley Fish and Jack Balkin, it has to be so "off the wall" that any
"interpretive community" of which one is a party would scoff at it and
seriously question the competence of the person asserting it.76 Perhaps it is
simply meant as a joke! Jack, Jordan Steiker, and I once wrote a piece in the
Texas Law Review that questioned whether one could always tell the
difference between "serious" arguments and "parodies" of legal argument.7 7
I think you make extremely powerful arguments on why the "better
reading" of the Constitution prevents "unilateral withdrawal." But, as I've
already suggested, that's not the most basic question. It is, rather, whether
the Southern reading, based in part on the "compact theory" of Union
enunciated in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions78 written by Jefferson
and Madison, respectively, was a "possible" reading. You will tell me, of
course, altogether correctly, that Madison rejected, near the end of his life,
when John Calhoun and other South Carolina hotheads began bruiting about
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
74. Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353 (1986).
75. Id. at 375.
76. Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The
Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 27, 28 (2005); Stanley Fish, How Come You
Do Like You Do? A Response to Dennis Patterson, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 57 (1993).
77. Jordan Steiker, Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Taking Text and Structure Really
Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEXAS L. REv.
237 (1995).
78. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 322-23.
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the possibility of secession, the legitimacy of reading the 1798 Resolutions as
supporting secession. 9 I have no doubt that this was Madison's sincere
belief. But, of course, authors do not control the use that readers make of
their arguments.
Also, for what it is worth, I think that the word "unilateral" is doing a
lot of work in your argument. I'm curious what you think of the Quebec
Secession Reference case decided by the Canadian Supreme Court, which
seemingly held both that Quebec had no right, under either Canadian or
international law, unilaterally to secede from Canada, but that Canada might
be under a duty to negotiate with Quebec about possible terms of secession if
the province clearly indicated a desire to leave the country.80
Finally, although I happen to agree with you that Robert E. Lee and
Jefferson Davis might well have been tried (and executed) as traitors to the
Union instrumental in causing the death of 750,000 Unionists and
Confederates on behalf of the totally abhorrent cause of maintaining chattel
slavery, that is not the way our history worked out. To be sure, Lee and
Davis were not pardoned during their lives, but it is illuminating-and
perhaps discouraging-that Congress in 1975 and 1978 passed Joint
Resolutions posthumously restoring full rights of citizenship to both.8' In
signing the 1978 Resolution concerning the would-be President of the
Confederacy Davis, President Jimmy Carter, wrote that
[i]n posthumously restoring the full rights of citizenship to
Jefferson Davis, the Congress officially completes the long process of
reconciliation that has reunited our people following the tragic conflict
between the States. Earlier, he was specifically exempted from
resolutions restoring the rights of other officials in the Confederacy.
He had served the United States long and honorably as a soldier,
Member of the U.S. House and Senate, and as Secretary of War.
General Robert E. Lee's citizenship was restored in 1976. It is fitting
that Jefferson Davis should no longer be singled out for punishment.
Our Nation needs to clear away the guilts and enmities and
recriminations of the past, to finally set at rest the divisions that
threatened to destroy our Nation and to discredit the principles on
which it was founded. Our people need to turn their attention to the
important tasks that still lie before us in establishing those principles
for all people.82
79. DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 62-69(2003).
80. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217, 271-73 (Can.).
81. S.J. Res. 23, 94th Cong., 89 Stat. 380 (1975); S.J. Res. 16, 95th Cong., 92 Stat. 1304
(1978).




It was, of course, William Faulkner, the great Mississippi-born novelist,
who wrote "The past is never dead. It's not even past."83 So it is the great
conflagration of 1861-1865 which continues to shape our history and our
sense of constitutional possibility a full 150 years after its occurrence. If we
really viewed Lee and Davis as "traitors" who committed "treason," then
Carter's remarks and the congressional resolution would be as unthinkable as
the British placing a monument honoring George Washington in Trafalgar
Square.
There is also, let me note, a certain irony in pointing to the British
Treaty of Union of 1707 between England and Scotland (that created the
United Kingdom), for Scotland will be voting next year on withdrawing from
the United Kingdom and thus basically undoing the Treaty.84 The vote is
occurring with the reluctant approval of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II's
Government,85 and we certainly do not know what the consequences of an
affirmative vote would be. But, again for better and for worse, secessionist
movements are alive and well in today's world, whether based on abstract
notions of "self-determination" and, as The Declaration of Independence put
it, the fundamental norm of government by "consent of the governed,"86 or
on more legalistic notions. After all, the oft-derided Soviet Constitution, in
its Article 72, explicitly permitted the secession of the constituent Soviet
Socialist Republics.87 To be sure, one can presume that it never occurred to
any member of the Soviet elite that Article 72 would be taken seriously. But
there it was, to provide a legitimizing rhetoric for the republics wanting to
leave the Soviet empire. But enough about secession, which we can both
agree is not a live political possibility in the contemporary United States and,
therefore, renders legal arguments of no practical interest.
I want to move on to the last part of your letter. It is certainly true that I
do blame the Constitution for the present pickle we are in regarding the
actual inability of the American national government to engage in any
serious attempt to resolve the manifest challenges that face us as a polity.
One need not look far to read respected analysts and political pundits refer to
the present American political system as "dysfunctional" or even, in
Thomas L. Friedman's word, "pathological." I quite deliberately begin
83. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR ANUN 81(1st Vintage Books ed. 1960) (1950).
84. Anthony Faiola, Britain, Scotland Sign Deal to Allow Independence Vote, WASH. POST,
Oct. 15, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-15/world/35501979_1-scottish-national-
party-independence-vote-scottish-referendum.
85. Agreement Between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a
Referendum on Independence for Scotland, Oct. 15, 2012, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/
Resource/0040/00404789.pdf.
86. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
87. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] art. 72.
88. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE Us: How AMERICA
FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND How WE CAN COME BACK 243 (2011) (lamenting
the "pathologies of the [American) political system").
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Framed with a review of such comments by Friedman and others. If one
does not find these descriptions at all plausible, then in a deep sense, we have
nothing to discuss. Those who believe that nothing is broken also, obviously,
see nothing that may need fixing. But I don't think you are so complacent.
Let me be clear, though, that when I say the Constitution deserves its
share of the blame, I do not mean to say that it is even remotely the sole
cause of our present discontents. All I want to insist is that it is at least a
partial cause, with the exact weight inevitably unknown. Perhaps it is only
5%, perhaps 25%; even I do not argue for a larger number. But I think it is
important to realize that in times of crisis, like being faced with the prospect
of driving over a cliff, factors that in calmer and happier times might be
nearly irrelevant can suddenly precipitate the ultimate disaster. "I knew I
should have checked those brakes, but they always stopped in time before."
Or consider the aspirin tablet, a true friend of humankind in many important
respects. Like most people my age, I take an aspirin every night before
retiring, secure in the knowledge that it will do its part to prevent heart
attacks and, apparently, many other diseases. That is the unequivocal good
news. But it turns out that aspirin can be literally fatal under certain
circumstances, either by interacting with other drugs in a decidedly negative
way or by preventing the body, say, from forming necessary blood clots
when bleeding.90 (This is why one is told not to take aspirin before
undergoing surgery, for example.) 1  So it is with the Constitution. I
certainly don't have to agree that it is deficient in all respects at all times; that
is not my view. Nor do I even have to agree with William Lloyd Garrison
that prior to the Reconstruction Amendments, it was a "covenant with Death
and an agreement with Hell," though that is in fact my view. That is
irrelevant with regard to determining the consequences of living under our
Constitution in 2013. All I have to do is to persuade you-and, I hope, other
readers-that the framework of government established in 1787 and left
remarkably unchanged in too many important respects thereafter has become
toxic when interacting with other aspects of our polity and political culture.
Consider, for example, the recent book by Norman Ornstein and
Thomas Mann, It's Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American
Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism.12 It is,
as they suggest, "the American constitutional system" that has rendered
pathological the capture of one of our two leading political parties by
89. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 7-12.
90. E.g., Shauna S. Roberts, Take Tivo: Aspirin, MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY, Oct. 2000, at 23
available at http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/archive/mdd/v03/iO8/htmi/10health.html; Aspirin Disease
Interactions, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/disease-interactions/aspirin.html.
91. See Kenneth S. Scher, Unplanned Reoperation for Bleeding, 62 AM. SURGEON 52, 52
(1996) (finding that preoperative use of aspirin was associated with heavy bleeding in most
patients).
92. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012).
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ideological extremists who have adopted a scorched-earth approach to
politics. 93 James Madison and his friends were desperate to stave off the rise
of political parties, which could well be viewed as exemplars of what
Madison so memorably called "factions" in Federalist No. 10.9 4 Quite
obviously, they utterly failed, and Madison himself became one of the key
leaders of the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans who contended with
Hamiltonian Federalists. But we have never in our 225-year history truly
figured out how to integrate partisan political parties and the "divided
governments" they often produce (as has been true during most of the
lifetimes of most of our readers) into our system of "separation of powers."
As Daryl Levinson (no relation) and Richard Pildes have argued, we must
fully confront the implications of "separation of parties" instead of being
fixated on eighteenth-century notions of "separation of powers." 95
The written Constitution is almost wholly devoid of anything helpful in
this regard, save the importance of the implicit recognition within the
Twelfth Amendment that presidents would be elected as the result of partisan
elections and, therefore, that there should be separate tracks for the president
and vice president instead of asking electors to vote for the two individuals
they thought were best qualified to be president9 6 (which gave us the very
bad political marriage of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson in 1797-
180 1).9 Do you believe that the "unwritten Constitution," properly
understood, provides any genuine guidance with regard to preventing the
further breakdown of our political system?
Finally, I want to resist your invitation to spend much of our exchange
on specific reforms. I certainly have many in mind, some of which I know
you agree with. They concern such subjects-and this is only a partial list-
as the electoral college, the allocation of voting power in the Senate, life
tenure for Supreme Court justices, and perhaps most importantly, changing
the Draconian Article V that makes it next to impossible seriously to amend
the Constitution with regard to anything of genuine significance (and
controversy). But what most dismays me, and I'm afraid sometimes turns
me into something of a crank, is that there is no serious conversation at all
taking place at the national level about any kind of serious constitutional
reform. What I strongly desire, as you know, is a new constitutional
convention. I think there is much to learn from, and emulate, in the fact that
there have been 233 state constitutional conventions in our national history
and that each of the fifty states has had an average of almost three
93. Id. at xiii-xiv.
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 22, at 42.
95. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REv. 2311, 2311, 2315 (2006).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
97. See MARK 0. HATFIELD, SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1789-1993), at 21-23 (1997) (discussing the differing views of Jefferson and Adams).
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constitutions." The 1787 Constitution, as you know very well, ruthlessly
displaced the six-year-old Articles of Confederation, our first constitution,
and what makes the Philadelphia convention and the ratifying process
afterwards so inspiring to many of us was precisely the willingness of
leading figures of the time to engage in full and frank-often quite
brilliant-debate about the adequacy of our political institutions. That's
what is missing today.
There are two Madisons who haunt our national history. One is the
Madison of Federalist No. 49, who sharply rejected the advice of his friend
Thomas Jefferson, a supporter of frequent conventions and the scrutiny they
would bring, in favor of trying to create a national culture of "veneration" of
the Constitution.99 The other is the Madison of Federalist No. 14, my
favorite of all of the 85 essays that he, Hamilton, and Jay wrote to defend
what came out of Philadelphia. I cannot too often reread (or quote) the final
paragraph of that essay:
Is it not the glory of the people of America that, whilst they have paid
a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they
have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for
names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the
knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own
experience? ... Had no important step been taken by the leaders of
the Revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered, no
government established of which an exact model did not present itself,
the people of the United States might, at this moment have been
numbered among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must
at best have been laboring under the weight of some of those forms
which have crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind. Happily for
America, happily, we trust, for the whole human race, they pursued a
new and more noble course.... They formed the design of a great
Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and
perpetuate. 00
I have no hesitation, therefore, in embracing this Madison by suggesting
that the lessons of our own experience, in today's America, suggest that we
need to ask hard questions about what aspects of our Constitution, written or
unwritten, are worth preserving and which, concomitantly, should be
changed.
Finally, I repeat my entreaty from my first letter: How should we
change our pedagogy-and perhaps our casebooks as well-in order to
instantiate the visions of constitutional discourse that we believe are too often
missing within the crabbed confines of the contemporary legal academy? In
many ways, you have the easier task, for, as you emphasized, you see your
98. JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 7 (2009).
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison), supra note 22, at 311, 314.
100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, (James Madison), supra note 22, at 99-100 (emphasis added).
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central task as preparing students to be lawyers, though ones who are
sensitized to the importance of making new arguments, based on the
"unwritten Constitution," that may be lacking in their present education. My
critique, in contrast, is directed far more at training our students to become
better citizens and leaders, capable of asking how well the Constitution
serves us as a structure of governance, rather than better lawyers as such. It
is, after all, one of my central arguments that there are two Constitutions, the
"Constitution of Conversation" that we obsess about in our classes and
articles and the "Constitution of Settlement" that we ignore precisely because
there is really nothing to argue about in terms of "interpretation" or
"approaches to the Constitution" with respect to the meaning of "two
senators," January 20, or the various percentages of the vote needed to
override presidential vetoes or propose or ratify constitutional amendments.
They raise profound questions about wisdom, but legal education shies away
from those discussions in favor of endless debates about interpretation-such
as the possible legitimacy of secession!




So much to talk about, and so little time! So let me narrow the issues
down. I don't know enough about Canadian constitutional law or
international law to have strong views about Quebec. Nor do I have much to
say about how best to construe a Soviet Constitution born in blood and terror,
force and fraud-unlike America's Constitution, which emerged via a
continental vote and conversation far more democratic and participatory than
anything the world had ever seen. (On this last point, see Chapter I of.
America's Constitution and Chapter 2 of America's Unwritten Constitution.)
For better or worse, I have concentrated on American constitutional law-its
text, history, structures, doctrines, traditions, and so on. As for England and
Scotland, please note that Britain as a whole has agreed to put various issues
of Scottish autonomy/independence on the agenda.'01 So nothing happening
there today retroactively supports the right to unilaterally secede claimed by
South Carolina in 1860.
On my view, then, were there no legal arguments on South Carolina's
side? I needn't say that. I need only insist that whatever legal arguments
South Carolina did make and could have made, these arguments were clearly
worse-legally, as measured by the proper rules and modalities of
constitutional interpretation-than the contrasting Unionist arguments. (An
analogy: Obama did not need to win every electoral vote. He just needed to
101. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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win more electoral votes than the other guy. He did, and that's why he was
clearly reelected.)
So why then did South Carolinians and others in 1860 make the legal
arguments they did in support of secession? Not, on my view, because these
arguments were legally strong when compared to the decisive Unionist
refutations. The deal in 1787-1788 was straightforward: The text meant
what it said about "the supreme Law of the Land" and virtually no one in that
fateful year said that a state could secede unilaterally. But for all its
admirable and democratic features, the Founders' Constitution failed to put
slavery on a path of extinction, and in fact featured key provisions-
especially the Three-Fifths Clause' 02-that ended up giving slavocrats far too
much power in antebellum America. With that undue power, Southern
slavocrats in the mid-nineteenth century tried to rewrite history, twist law,
and suppress truth. Ultimately, this slave-sick Southern society tried to undo
a lawful and democratic election by force of arms, and nearly destroyed the
last, best hope of earth-government of, by, and for the people.
If my account is right, what follows? Among other things, we can see
more clearly where the Founders went right and where they went wrong, and
what we must do today-the very issues, Sandy, that you want our fellow
citizens to ponder. But our fellow citizens are unlikely to think straight about
these issues unless they understand history and law with rigor and precision.
Contrary to what you sometimes seem to be saying (or might be
misunderstood as saying), the Founders did not go wrong by being unclear
about secession. But they did go wrong in failing to credibly address the
deadly cancer of slavery in their midst. This failure, and this cancer, almost
killed America. And even today, there are remnants of this Founding failure
in our existing constitutional regime. The electoral college is a close cousin
of the Three-Fifths Clause. It was initially designed in 1787, and redesigned
in 1803-1804 (via the Twelfth Amendment), to accommodate southern
slaveholding.'03  In a direct-election world, the South would have
consistently been outvoted, because of course slaves could not vote.104 But
thanks to the electoral college, the South could count its slaves in the
electoral college; the more slaves a slave state had, the more House seats and
electoral votes that slave state would get05-a truly vicious system.
So a more careful and correct legal story about secession and slavery
can actually help our fellow citizens see that perhaps the electoral college
should be modified today. The college's roots are in fact intertwined with
slavery and the Three-Fifths Clause. And even today, our presidential
election system has democracy-dampening features, compared to direct
national election. Just as Virginia at the Founding got a fixed number of
102. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, para. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, para. 2-3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.




electoral votes regardless of how many or how few persons it enfranchised-
and even though it disfranchised a vast proportion of its population-so
Virginia today gets a fixed number of electoral votes whether lots of
Virginians or very few show up on election day. But in a reformed,
Levinson-Amar world of direct popular election, Virginia's government
would have incentives to facilitate voting in Virginia. The more voters from
Virginia, the more clout Virginia would have in the overall presidential
contest; the fewer voters, the less clout.
In Chapter 12, I explain how a direct-popular system could actually take
root without the need for an Article V amendment. 06  (Once this system
actually began to operate, it would then become easier to adopt a formal
amendment codifying the new status quo.) Chapter 12 also offers up a way
to unclog the amendment process more generally via textual amendments
that could be voted upon now but that would not go into effect-would not
"sunrise"-until far in the future, enabling the current generation to become
Rawlsian framers, behind a veil of ignorance, for generations yet unborn. 07 1
first floated this idea in my 2005 book, 08 and I was delighted to see that in
your first two chapters, you, too, sought to invite "readers [to] detach
themselves from the immediate political moment by contemplating the
powers they would wish (or at least be willing) to grant the (unknown and
unpredictable) president who will be elected in 2016 (or 2020)."'o To do
you one better, Sandy, how about an amendment agreed to now that would
only go into effect in 2056 or 2060? With such a time horizon, it might be
possible for today's Americans, in your words, to "tame some of the partisan
passions almost necessarily present if we focus on known political leaders or
groups.""o
106. AMAR, supra note 1, at 456-63.
107. Id. at 475.
108. AMAR, supra note 1, at 428 n.*.
109. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 44.
110. Id. Your mention of "partisan[ship]" in this passage does prompt me to respond to what
you say about political parties in your most recent letter. As you know, I devote an entire chapter to
political parties-Chapter 10, "Joining the Party: America's Partisan Constitution." In that chapter,
I try to show how parties are in fact more visible in the text of the written Constitution than is
conventionally understood, and how these parties are also an enormous feature of America's
unwritten Constitution. You seem to think America's two-party system itself is dysfunctional.
LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 10. 1 say that in general a two-party system is an important stabilizing
mechanism in actual American governance, and that our present woes are simply due to the fact that
at present, a significant portion of the Republican Party has gone kooky. But I predict that the party
will straighten itself out because the system creates strong incentives (called elections) for it to do
so. And I had you specifically in mind when I wrote the concluding words of Chapter 10:
Despite all that we have seen, it cannot be said that the Constitution directly addresses
political parties in a comprehensive fashion. Is this because, as some scholars have
claimed, the document's rules concerning elections and the political process-
especially its provisions governing presidential politics and presidential authority-are
the petrified fossils of an eighteenth-century world, wholly ill-fitting the political
realities of modem America?
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And here we come back to our contrasting accounts of secession. You
seem to suggest, in your opening chapter, that the Constitution of 1787-1788
was "resolutely silent" on the secession issue because the issue was perhaps
"too volatile.""' Hogwash. The Constitution was clear, but the war came in
the 1860s because the Constitution elsewhere pandered to slavery, and
slavery corrupted all it touched-including the truth and proper legal
argumentation. But on my account, slavery itself did raise difficult political
issues: How could free states and slave states in the 1780s find common
ground and come together to form the necessary geographically indivisible
union? I claim that the Founders failed not because they compromised with
slavery: Some compromise was indeed necessary to launch the Union. But
the Three-Fifths Clause was the wrong kind of compromise-the kind of
compromise that you in your book refer to as a "rotten" compromise,
building on the work of Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit.' 12 The reason
the Three-Fifths Clause was truly "rotten" is that it surrendered the future. It
gave slavocrats extra political clout in every election in perpetuity. It failed
to provide a structural mechanism for the long are of history to bend toward
justice. The framers should have instead used more "sunrise" clauses, I
argue." Just as the Constitution allowed the transatlantic slave trade to
continue for twenty years, but provided that Congress could ban this odious
The evidence suggests otherwise. At the very moment that national parties arose,
they began to integrate themselves into the Constitution in both text and deed.
America's modem presidency is not the product of eighteenth-century mistakes that
later Americans have simply been unable to comprehend or correct. Although the
presidency was originally designed for a nonpartisan figure-George Washington-the
office was repeatedly redesigned, via many different amendments adopted over the
course of many decades, to fit the rise of more partisan chief executives including
Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson. Most
of the rules of presidential power are robust. These rules first worked without an
entrenched two-party system and now work within such a system.
To put the point another way, virtually all states have created governorships that
look amazingly like the presidency, and most states created these presidential look-
alikes after the rise of America's two-party system. Almost no state constitution
comprehensively regulates political parties, even though many written state
constitutions are quite detailed and relatively easy to amend.
All this evidence suggests that there is a different reason why political parties
receive rather spotty treatment in America's fifty-one written constitutions, state and
federal. The explanation, quite simply, is that it is far from clear what a more
comprehensive constitutional regulatory framework should look like.... (V]irtually
no state constitution regulates political parties in dramatically different fashion than
does the federal Constitution. Unless and until several state constitutions come along
and demonstrate a better mousetrap for addressing American-style political parties,
most Americans are unlikely to view the federal Constitution as defective in this
regard.
AMAR, supra note 1, at 415-16.
111. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 19.
112. See id. at 43-53 (considering the Constitution in light of Margalit's theory of "rotten
compromise").
113. AMAR, supra note 1, at 474-76.
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traffic in 1808 and thereafter, so the document should have allowed slave
states to get extra credit in the House and electoral college (via the Three-
Fifths Clause, or some variant) only until 1808, but not thereafter. Likewise,
the Framers could and should have provided that slavery as a legal system
would need to begin to end by 1808, and that all persons born in America
after 1808 would be born free. Or all persons born after 1818, or 1838, or
1888. The specific date is less important than the big, Rawlsian idea: Since
slavery was morally wrong, the Founders should have provided for its
ultimate extinction. After 1808 or 1838 or whenever, antislavery rules
agreed to in 1788 should have been allowed to "sunrise."
And with that idea, Sandy, I come to the final questions that you have
posed. When I teach law students, I do indeed stress proper rules of legal
interpretation, and I use the secession issue as a case study in proper legal
method. Here was perhaps the most momentous constitutional question ever
to arise in America, and the standard legal methods do indeed point to a
clearly correct legal result! But when I teach undergraduates, Sandy, I am
more concerned with larger issues of citizenship preparation. And so I end
my undergraduate class, as I end both America's Constitution and America's
Unwritten Constitution, with a sweeping gesture toward the twenty-second
century and beyond. Though I do not believe our very constitutional system
is currently in crisis, I do find it notably imperfect, and I urge my students-
the future leaders of the twenty-first century-to ponder perhaps the most
important aspects of America's unwritten Constitution: the amendments still
to be written, and the Constitution of 2020, of 2121, and beyond.
I began this letter by saying that we have so much to talk about and so
little time. Of course, I meant only that there is little time left in this final
round. But I hope there will be lots of time in other venues down the road.




As I write this literally on December 31, 2012, I can't think of a better
way to begin the New Year than by continuing, albeit briefly, the
discussion-and looking forward, of course, to far more extended
conversations in the future.
I suspect there's not much more to say about secession. I think the most
important area in which we agree is not only that the original Constitution
was significantly blemished by its "rotten compromises" with slavery, but
also that the ostensible "reconstruction" of the nation following the slaughter
of roughly 750,000 participants in the warfare of 1861-186514 was itself
114. J. David Hacker, A Census-Based Count of the Civil War Dead, 57 CIV. WAR HIST. 307,
311 (2011). Relying on newly-released census data from the 1850, 1860, 1870, and 1880 censuses,
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blemished by the unwillingness or political inability of those who wished to
achieve truly fundamental "regime change" to achieve their objectives. As I
write in Framed, the benefits to the "slavocracy" of the Three-Fifths Clause
were followed, perversely, by the even greater benefits of counting the
former slaves as full persons, but still, in much of the former Confederacy,
not voting participants.'s Thus what I called the "segregation bonus"
entrenched Southern racists in the House (and, for somewhat different
reasons, the Senate) until my adult lifetime.' 16 I am aware, of course, of your
efforts in your chapter on the Warren Court to read Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument combating this "segregation
bonus.""'7  I have no trouble accepting your interpretation of Section 2, and
one can imagine an alternate history of American constitutional development
in which Section 2 would have been vigorously enforced by Congress (or
even by the judiciary). Alas, that is not the constitutional development we in
fact got, and Section 2 was functionally rendered a dead letter, much to our
mutual dismay. True "regime change" was just too radical to contemplate,
especially when the American narrative turned to "reconciliation" of the
white North and South. 18
It may be that the most important disagreement concerns the perception
of "crisis" confronting the American political system. Again, as I originally
wrote these words, the United States seemed poised to go over what has
(probably unhelpfully) become labeled as the "fiscal cliff."' 19 Even though I
now know (on January 2) that a patchwork agreement between Vice
demographic and social historian J. David Hacker has challenged the most frequently cited figure of
Civil War fatalities, 620,000, estimating that 750,000 men died as a result of the War, with a
probable margin of error of plus or minus 100,000. Id. at 311-12.
115. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 183-84.
116. Id. at 186-187.
117. AMAR, supra note 1, at 187-89. The Amendment reads:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors
for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers ofa State, or the members of the Legislature thereof is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
118. See DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY
107 (2001) (arguing that "the most vigorous advocates of reconciliation believed they had to banish
slavery and race from the discussion").
119. See Tom Geoghegan, Who, What, Why: Who First Called It a 'Fiscal Cliff'?, BBC NEWS
MAG., Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20318326 (discussing arguments that
the term "fiscal cliff" used by Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke to refer to the
expiration of Bush-era tax cuts and automatic reductions in government spending set for Jan. 1,
2013-was an unhelpful metaphor for what would likely be a more gradual process).
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President Biden and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell staves it
off,120 no one seriously believes that it will do anything more than kick the
can down the road perhaps only for several weeks, let alone months or
years.' 2 1 It is all too likely that we continue to face a debacle over raising the
national debt ceiling, which in 2011 led to the downgrading of United States
financial instruments, 122 not because of worries about the American
economic system as such, but because of concerns that were expressed about
the American political system. I really do think you underestimate the
importance of the alarms being sounded by such sober analysts as Mann and
Ornstein or Tom Friedman. And if it is true, as I far more than you believe is
the case, that the Constitution itself contributes to the dysfunctionality by
virtue of the interactive effects of the separation-of-powers system with what
Mann and Ornstein call the basically parliamentary party ethos, especially of
the Republican Party, then I think we must address these issues sooner rather
than later. More than you, I suspect, I am disinclined to believe that most
lawyers have much to say that is helpful concerning these issues precisely
because, with rare exceptions, they don't call on our well-developed talents
for interpretation, but rather, ultimately, the redesign of some of our
institutions in light of what Madison called the "lessons of experience" and
the best teachings of what Hamilton in Federalist No. 9 was willing to call
"[t]he science of politics."l 23
I do believe that the challenge facing any of us teaching about
constitutions in America in the 21st century is to figure out ways genuinely
to integrate both the United States and American state constitutions, on the
one hand, and the Constitution(s) of Settlement with the Constitution(s) of
Conversation, on the other. Sufficient integration raises questions not only of
pedagogy, but also, of course, of decisions by law school appointment
committees as to what skill sets should be sought in potential teachers and,
120. Janet Hook et al., Congress Passes Cliff Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323320404578215373352793876.html.
121. See David Brooks & Gail Collins, The Fiscal Riff OPINIONATOR, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2013, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/02/the-fiscal-riff/?hp ("Not averted. Postponed.
We've got another catastrophe coming in a couple of months with the return of sequestration. And
by the way how is anybody in government actually supposed to plan a budget when the whole thing
may blow up again in 60 days?").
122, In a statement published August 5, 2011, Standard and Poors explained that it had lowered
its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States because it believed that the "prolonged
controversy" over raising the debt ceiling and "the related fiscal policy debate" indicated that
"further near-term progress containing the growth in public spending, especially on entitlements, or
on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is less likely than [it] previously assumed and will
remain a contentious and fitful process." United States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To
"AA +" Due To Political Risks, Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative, STANDARD & POORS
(Aug. 5, 2011, 8:13 PM EST), http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetlD=
1245316529563.
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 22, at 72; Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Cooper (Mar. 23, 1824), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: 1819-1836,
177, 181 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
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ultimately, decisions by curriculum committees as to how much
"constitutional law" should be required, as against being left to the market-
system of electives. Both of us teach at schools that continue to emphasize
the importance of "constitutional law." But Yale and The University of
Texas may become increasing outliers in this regard, especially as the legal
academy responds to the economic crises that are reshaping legal education
in front of our eyes (and about which I know that you have especially strong
views).
There is certainly not time now to explore all of the implications raised
by various conceptions of what my friend and colleague Gary Jacobsohn
calls "constitutional identity." 24 But I certainly hope that we have many
years together of active conversation and colleagueship exploring those
implications.
Sandy
124. GARY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (2010).
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Unsettling the Settled: Challenging the Great and
Not-So-Great Compromises in the Constitution
FRAMED: AMERICA'S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE.
By Sanford Levinson. New York, New York: Oxford University Press,
2012. 448 pages. $29.95.
Reviewed by Robert F. Williams*
Sandy Levinson has, once again, written an extremely interesting and
provocative book. It follows rather directly from his 2006 Our
Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How
We the People Can Correct It),' continuing his "loving criticism"2 of the
American federal Constitution. Levinson's overall thesis is that the United
States Constitution was framed in an atmosphere of national crisis, resulting
in a number of compromises as to governmental structures that were
understandable at the time but which may have become dysfunctional and in
need of change after several centuries of operation.3 He points to the
tremendous growth of the American territory and population, together with
the unanticipated rise of political parties, as providing a partial explanation
for the current "crisis in governance" that he describes in the book.4 He
contends that we are trapped, or "framed," by the view that federal
governmental structures that are entrenched in the Constitution cannot (and
should not) be changed. He asks "whether fears that made sense in 1787
need control us today."
Levinson reviews the "crisis in governance" at both the national and
state levels. He describes the "gridlock" in Washington, D.C., in areas such
as major policy initiatives, approval of judicial nominations, ratification of
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden; Associate
Director, Center for State Constitutional Studies.
i. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006) [hereinafter LEVINSON, OUR
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION].
2. SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA'S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF
GOVERNANCE 32 (2012) [hereinafter LEVINSON, FRAMED]; see also Sanford Levinson,
Introduction: Imperfection and Amendability, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 3 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter
Levinson, Introduction] (contending that the Constitution is imperfect).
3. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 12, 34-40.
4. Id. at 7, 9.
5. Id. at 8.
6. Id. at 215.
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treaties, etc.7  Further, he reminds us of the dysfunction and possible
"ungovernability" of states like California. He acknowledges that not all
problems arise from the provisions of the formal federal and state
constitutions themselves, but contends that the "settled" provisions of these
constitutions may, in fact, be the root of a number of these problems.9
This book, as Professor Levinson proudly notes, is unusual for several
reasons. First, its focus is on the provisions of the federal Constitution that
are "settled" and therefore not subject to academic debate or analysis, or to
judicial interpretation and litigation.'o Almost the entire focus of American
constitutional law, in both political science and law, is on the great questions
of interpretation of the Constitution, with very little attention to its clear
provisions, such as the date on which the President will be inaugurated.
Levinson refers to these "settled" (and, for the most part, unquestioned and
accepted) provisions as the "Constitution of Settlement."" By contrast, he
refers to the open-textured provisions of the Constitution, subject to scholarly
debate and judicial interpretation, as the "Constitution of Conversation."' 2
He breaks with almost all American constitutional law scholarship by only
considering the former:
This book is far more concerned with analogues to the
Inauguration Day Clause than to the Equal Protection Clause. Though
their meaning is indisputable, there is nothing trivial about such
clauses. In fact, they may better explain the failures of our political
system and fears about governability than the "magnificent
generalities" explain its successes....
Indeed, this book is predicated on the proposition that almost
all of the Constitution of Settlement is very much worth talking about
by anyone interested in the practicalities of American government[.]
However, the nature of the discourse about the Constitution of
Settlement is quite different from that generated by the Constitution of
Conversation. The latter involves constitutional meaning; the former
involves the wisdom of clear constitutional commands.' 3
Secondly, Professor Levinson includes in his analysis recurring
references to the constitutions of the fifty American states. Today, most
"constitutional law" study and scholarship retains an exclusive focus on the
7. Id. at 1-5.
8. Id. at 4-5.
9. Id. at 5-7 ("But the formalities can make a real difference.").
10. Id. at 19, 25-26.
I1. Id. at 19.
12. Id.; see id. at 6 ("This book is very much about constitutional structures, and not, for
example, about constitutional rights.").
13. Id. at 19, 23; see also id. at 354 ("One lesson is that constitutions of settlement do not
necessarily settle, once and for all, the issue under examination."); id. at 146-47, 357-58
(contending that the Constitution cannot and should not "settle" issues for every generation).
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federal Constitution. 14 Further, he regularly refers to the constitutions of
other countries as shedding light on choices reflected in our federal
Constitution, the most obvious being their use of a parliamentary rather than
a presidential system.
This book is extremely important and useful for a variety of reasons.
First, it provides a clear and understandable analysis of the original reasons
(often compromises) for many of the structural and seemingly
noncontroversial provisions of the Constitution. Levinson refers to the
Federalist Papers (which often adverted to state constitutions), the
arguments of the Anti-Federalists, and the debates at the state ratifying
conventions. Then, he places these provisions in modem context. He
describes the current serious defects in many of the structural arrangements
by reference to actual, fairly recent events, as well as to interesting and
troubling hypotheticals about things that might happen in the future.
Levinson has therefore provided a fascinating review of the theory behind
and the actual operation of our Constitution of Settlement.
Levinson dissects most of the compromises in the original Constitution
arising from the familiar small-state/large-state clash as well as the
North/South, slave-state/free-state conflict. In a chapter on compromise
itself (Chapter 2), Levinson notes that compromise is necessary in most
aspects of life and is certainly necessary, as Edmund Burke, James Madison,
and others recognized, in constitution making, both federal and state.15 But
some compromises are so "rotten" 6 as "to establish or maintain an inhuman
regime . . . of cruelty and humiliation, that is, a regime that does not treat
humans as humans."' Levinson questions whether the constitutional
compromises surrounding slavery were "worth it," particularly from the
point of view of the slaves themselves.' 8 Most people assume that we would
not have had a federal Constitution, at least not in 1787, without (1) the
"Great Compromise" where the House of Representatives was based on
population (including the "3/5 Compromise" which gave the slave states
greater representation in the House; that influence spilled over into the
Electoral College, thereby gaining a greater say for the southern states in who
would become President and, among other things, appoint Supreme Court
Justices)' 9 and the Senate was based on equal votes for the states; and (2) the
continuation of slavery. 20 The slavery question is a very important question,
14. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 28-29; ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF
AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1 (2009); Sanford Levinson, America's "Other Constitutions":
The Importance ofState Constitutions for Our Law and Politics, 45 TULSA L. REV. 813, 813 (2010).
15. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 33, 40.
16. Id. at 43 (citing AvISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES
(2009)).
17. Id. at 44 (quoting MARGALIT, supra note 16, at 2).
18. Id. at 51.
19. Id. at 37-38.
20. Id. at 38-40.
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albeit academic today. But even asking the question may move readers to let
their reverence and veneration for the federal Constitution slip a bit to
consider whether the current dysfunction of some of these compromise
provisions is "worth it" today.
Levinson shines his analytical light on, among other "settled"
provisions, the clauses specifying the date of inauguration, 21 state control of
22 2elections, eligibility for public office,23 bicameralism (with particular
criticism of the Senate),24 the presidential veto,25 the Electoral College, the
presidential as opposed to parliamentary system, 27 the unitary Executive28
including powers such as pardoning,29 making treaties,3o etc.-length of
presidential terms,3 the role of the Vice President, impeachment (only for
misconduct and not for incompetence), divided government,34 the
independent judiciary35 (including methods of selection and judicial review),
federalism, 36 methods of amendment,3 7 and emergency powers.38  It is the
wisdom of these provisions today in which Professor Levinson is interested.
He admits that readers might disagree with him as to the actual negative
consequences of these provisions ("empirical assumptions"), or whether
these consequences are "desirable or undesirable" ("normative
arguments").
Surprisingly, a number of these "settled" provisions turn out to be
problematic under Levinson's critical eye. Just a few examples will indicate
the fresh look that he provides for many of the provisions we all take for
granted. For example, returning to the Inauguration Day Clause, this results
in a several-month "lame duck" period for either a defeated president or one
who has served his or her second term-longer than the same period for state
governors.4 0 During this period presidents have issued many questionable
21. Id. at 22-24.
22. Id. at 100-02.
23. Id. at 117-19.
24. Id. at 142-44.
25. Id. at 164-73.
26. Id. at 178-83.
27. Id. at 175-78.
28. Id at 239-44.
29. Id. at 194-201.
30. Id. at 201-02.
31. Id. at 209-13.
32. Id. at 221-28.
33. Id. at 213-19.
34. Id. at 229-33.
35. Id at 245-48.
36. Id. ch. 14.
37. Id. at 331-36.
38. Id. at 208, 374-83.
39. Id. at 7.
40. Id. at 22-25.
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pardons of convicted criminals, initiated substantial administrative rule-
making processes or repeals, and taken a number of other actions which do
not take place in, for example, a number of European countries where
transitions of power are quite swift.4 1 The American bicameral system, with
each house having an absolute veto over lawmaking, is one of the
undemocratic features of the United States Constitution that has already been
pointed out by Professor Levinson. This situation is exacerbated by the
structure of the Senate, which with equal votes for each state, permits "the
smallest twenty-six states, which together have approximately 17 percent of
the national population, [to] elect a majority of the Senate."43 The
presidential veto, of course, is also undemocratic, and Levinson criticizes it
for permitting the veto of legislation enacted by both houses based on the
policy preference of the President rather than only on constitutional
considerations." He contrasts the federal Constitution's single Executive
official, the President, with a number of the state constitutions that provide
for a "plural" executive, where a number of officers other than the Governor
are elected on a statewide basis.45 He notes that "forty-eight of the fifty
states do not give their governors the authority to name the attorney general,
perhaps the most important single executive branch official in terms of
providing potential oversight of the executive branch with regard to criminal
conduct."4 6 Levinson also points out that the federal unitary Executive,
which gives the President "the power to appoint all executive branch
officials," "lends a winner-take-all partisan character to presidential
elections."4 7 Many of us recognize this when we tell our friends that it is
important not simply to vote for a President whom one likes, but to
remember that the President who is elected will also likely appoint members
of his or her party all the way down to postmaster.
The much-maligned Electoral College, of course, does not escape
Levinson's criticism, where he describes the process of choosing the
President as "quite [a] spectacularly different process [than that for choosing]
any state governor, all of whom are elected in statewide popular elections."48
Levinson notes further the Electoral College's potential for nonmajority-
elected presidents, the possibility of "so-called faithless electors who ...
reject their party's candidate in favor of their own idiosyncratic choices," and
the "winner-take-all" problem of state electors and "the one state, one vote
41. Id. at 24-25.
42. LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 30-38.
43. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 150.
44. Id. at 164.
45. Id. at 240.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 243.
48, Id. at 178.
11532013]
Texas Law Review
process by which the House breaks deadlocks"4 9 The conclusion that
Professor Levinson reaches concerning the Electoral College represents a
major theme in this book:
At the end of the day, the electoral college, perhaps like the specific
day the Constitution specifies for the inauguration of a new president,
simply exemplifies the importance of path dependence, the inertial
force possessed by past decisions whether or not we believe they make
much sense for us today. One can well doubt that "We the People"
would maintain the electoral college if the U.S. Constitution were as
easy to amend as most state constitutions. That it persists tells us
almost nothing about actual public opinion and much about the
difficulty of formal amendment.50
The federal Constitution has, of course, endured with very few
amendments since its ratification in 1789. That record, Levinson notes, is far
beyond the average length of duration for national constitutions." This is a
consequence of the reality that the federal Constitution is the most difficult in
the world to amend, let alone revise, and is generally a revered and venerated
document. 2 The "last truly significant change to the Constitution" was in
1951, limiting presidents to two terms.53 A constitution under which formal
change is extremely difficult leads to more change by interpretative methods,
either by the judiciary or through "constitutional moments"5 4 accomplished
by the Legislative and Executive Branches, with the possible acquiescence of
the judiciary. State constitutions, by contrast, are much easier to amend and
therefore, as Dr. Alan Tarr has observed, state constitutional change has
occurred more often (too often, some would say) through formal amendment
and revision mechanisms.55
Professor Levinson points out that the evolution of the structures of
state government, made possible through the availability of formal change,
has permitted the states to reevaluate, modify, and improve their
governmental structures.% As Dr. John Dinan has noted, this availability of
49. Id. at 188. Some states have taken it upon themselves to try to deal with the "non-majority
elected president" problem. See 888-Word Interstate Compact, NAT'L POPULAR VOTE,
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/misc/888wordcompact.php. See generally Robert W.
Bennett, Possibilities and Problems in the National Popular Vote Movement, 7 ELECTION LJ. 181
(2008) (reviewing JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL (1 ed., 8th prtg. 2006), and assessing
the "State-Based Plan for Electing the President by National Popular Vote").
50. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 190; see also id. at 127 (describing Madison's lack of
confidence in the ability of ordinary Americans to "exercise genuine political autonomy").
51. Id. at 335-37 (citing ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE
ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 210. Levinson notes that this settled provision bars even exceptional presidents from
serving more than two terms. Id. at 212.
54. Id. at 339.
55. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 23-28 (1998); WILLIAMS, supra
note 14, at 25, 82-83.
56. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 336.
1154 [Vol. 91:1149
Unsettling the Settled
formal change enabled the people of the states to have an actual
constitutional conversation about unsettling governmental structures that had
been seemingly settled by earlier generations. This kind of conversation
has been virtually impossible, with minor exceptions, at the federal level.
Some caution, however, should be exercised in looking to state
constitutional arrangements as models for our federal Constitution. 8 This is
because the American state constitutions function within the overall federal
constitutional structure, and are to some extent limited by that structure.
Furthermore, state constitutions operate with respect to subnational polities,
rather than a single national polity. As a consequence, at least in the United
States, state constitutions' origins, functions, form, and substance all differ
from the federal model.5 9 American state constitutions draw their essence
from the people themselves, who exercise forms of popular sovereignty in
adopting, amending, and revising state constitutions, and further in actually
participating in constitutional government through their approval at the polls
of matters such as the assumption of debt and the approval of gambling
programs.60 Further, the voices of nonelite people such as women,6 ' African
Americans, Native Americans, Latinos, plaintiffs, union members, and prison
reformers, as well as those of opponents of abortion and same-sex marriage
have been heard, and sometimes have prevailed, in the processes of state
constitutional change.62
State constitutions, in contrast to the federal Constitution's grants of
power to a limited federal government (albeit one expanded through judicial
decision and the practice of "constitutional moments"), function primarily to
limit the residual power the states retained at the time the United States
Constitution was ratified. This different function leads to a differing form
and content for the state constitutions. For example, they contain long
articles on taxation and finance, education, natural resources, etc.,64 which
are the matters that were retained for state competency. In addition, the state
constitutions contain much in the way of policy pronouncements that could
be relegated to ordinary statutes within the competence of state legislatures.
Consequently, care should be taken when looking to state constitutions as
substantive models for the federal Constitution. Further, the matters that will
57. JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 5 (2006) ("[Sltate
constitution makers' departures from the federal model are primarily attributable to the flexibility of
state amendment processes and the resulting opportunities to benefit from institutional knowledge
and experience throughout American history..); WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 25, 82-83;
LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 8, 14.
58. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 14, 26.
59. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 15-36.
60. Id. at 31.
61. Id. at 34-36.
62. Id. at 34-35.
63. Id. at 27, 249-55.




arise in any process of amendment or revision of the federal Constitution will
differ materially from those that will arise in the parallel state constitutional
processes.
Having issued that note of caution, however, state constitutional
arrangements (which are much less "settled" than federal constitutional
arrangements) such as an elected judiciary, 6 term limits, a plural executive,
and direct democracy, are matters that, despite one's view of them as policy
matters, do not seem dependent on the differences between state and federal
constitutions. This is particularly true for the mechanisms of change, through
amendment or revision, of state constitutions. Those do not necessarily have
to differ because they are subnational rather than national.6 7 Of course one of
the criticisms of state constitutions is that they are too easy to amend or
68revise.
There is always a tension in constitutions between rigidity and ease of
change. Thomas Jefferson supported the idea of easily amended
constitutions with review every generation.69  James Madison, by contrast,
supported more permanent constitutions. 70  As I have said, "If state
constitutional revision is too difficult, constitutionalism overwhelms
democracy; if it is too easy, democracy overwhelms constitutionalism. It is
difficult to achieve exactly the right balance, and this point might change
,,71over time. If many states (and they vary significantly) are too far toward
the democratic end of the continuum, then it seems like the federal
constitutional system (at least according to Article V) may be too far toward
the "constitutionalism" end.
65. See generally 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA
OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (describing
how traditionally, amendments to state constitutions concern local issues like state revenue rather
than national issues). However, recently a number of national issues such as same-sex marriage,
labor law, health reform, and others have been reflected in state constitutional amendments placed
on the ballot in some states. Robert F. Williams, Why State Constitutions Matter, 45 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 901, 903 (2011).
66. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 290.
67. But see Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1583,
1599-600 (2010) (contending that substate constitutions tend to be easier to amend than federal
constitutions).
68. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 761, 818-22 (1992) (enumerating a number of apparently frivolous state constitutional
provisions and linking their existence with the relative ease of amending state constitutions). But
see WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 25 ("Because of their relative ease of amendment, state
constitutions could be modified through trial and error over the years concerning matters that, for all
practical purposes, remain frozen in the federal Constitution.").
69. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 61; WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 363. Levinson
reveals that he has discovered his "inner Jefferson." LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 396.




In the face of the reality that the federal Constitution is virtually
unamendable, because of the restrictive requirements of Article V, 72
Professor Levinson makes a radical proposal: Do not follow Article V!73 He
invokes the crisis atmosphere of the 1780s, analogous to today's crisis in
governance at the state and federal levels, which of course led the Framers of
the federal Constitution to engage in a "runaway constitutional convention"
in violation of the instructions from Congress and the amendment
mechanisms of the Articles of Confederation.7 4 He describes the issue facing
the Framers in 1787:
The fate of the country was at stake, and one should hardly feel
obliged to conform to a provision of the existing constitution [the
requirement of unanimity to amend the Articles] that if followed in its
clear, unequivocal, and semantically undebatable meaning would
doom the enterprise of what Madison and others viewed as absolutely
necessary constitutional revision. 75
Again, what interests Levinson is not debate over the meaning of the
Constitution's settled provisions but rather an assessment of their wisdom in
current times. If the consequences of these settled provisions are bad
enough, he suggests a process to change them even if it defies the seemingly
settled provisions of Article V. This is serious stuff.
An instructive process took place at the state constitutional level where
conflicts arose over whether the rules laid down in the first state constitutions
for their amendment and revision actually had to be followed, or rather
whether the people in the exercise of their revolutionary popular sovereignty
could make extralegal but binding changes in their constitutions.76
Dr. Christian Fritz explained:
All Americans agreed that the people created government. They
differed over when that collective sovereign might be recognized as
having exercised its authority. Some recognized a multitude of ways,
none of them exclusive, in which the people could express their will.
In their expansive view, the people could use the formal procedures
articulated in a constitution to amend or dissolve that document. Such
procedures were not indispensable and the people's will could be
recognized in other ways. On the other hand, some took a more
72. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 11. Actually, the provisions of Article V are a bit less
clear than most of us have thought. See generally RESPONDING To IMPERFECTION, supra note 2
(discussing the difficulties with the interpretation of Article V in a number of essays). Also,
Levinson is not alone in suggesting that the formal requirements of Article V be "side-stepped."
LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 343-44.
73. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 343-44.
74. Id. at 347-58.
75. Id. at 354.
76. See generally CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2008) (tracing America's post-Revolution




constrained view. For them the sovereign spoke only in conformity
with procedures it set forth in advance. That was the exclusive way in
which the sovereign's voice would be recognized and heard.
The implications of this divide about when the sovereign had
spoken were significant. For instance, one implication was whether
the people of a past generation could bind a future one. If the people
were, in fact, sovereign, their hands could not be tied and their
sovereignty limited by an earlier generation. During this period, many
Americans believed that a constitution's expression of fundamental
rights and requirements for revisions could not dictate those terms to
future generations. The unborn sovereign people of a later period
were at liberty-just as the revolutionary generation had been-to
express their sovereign will. Thus, each generation of American
sovereigns would govern in its own way.
The necessity of following the "rules laid down" ultimately has won out
at the state constitutional level, but there were a number of examples of
extralegal successes. 8 At the federal level as well, obedience to the rules
laid down in Article V has been assumed; that point of view is rejected here
by Professor Levinson.
Levinson proposes an unlimited federal constitutional convention, with
the delegates chosen at random and compensated adequately, with their
proposed revisions being submitted to the people at a national referendum.7 9
A similar, although not extralegal (because it was a proposed two-step
process, with authorization first provided through an amendment to the state
constitution), approach was recently explored in California, but had to be
abandoned when fundraising failed to support the necessary steps of
amending the state constitution to implement the idea.o
Levinson points out that the Constitutional Convention's secrecy made
it easier to reach compromise than it would be now, when instant news
coverage would bring instant pressure and compromise has become less
supported.8 1 Also, compromise must often be accomplished in "real time," 82
with the actors being able to assess the actual partisan impact of their
concessions. For this reason, Levinson wisely suggests a Rawlsian "veil of
77. Id. at 293.
78. Id. at 285-88; see also LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 358 (pointing to Fritz's
conclusion that carrying out state constitutional change "even if contrary to established
constitutional procedures-is one of the hallmarks of American constitutionalism" (quoting
Christian G. Fritz, Recovering the Lost Worlds ofAmerica's Written Constitutions, 68 ALB. L. REV.
261, 262 (2005))).
79. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 391-92.
80. Evan Halper & Anthony York, California Constitutional Convention Push Fizzles, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/l3/local/la-me-constitutional-convention-
20 10feb13. See generally Symposium, Rebooting California: Initiatives, Conventions &
Government Reform, 44 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 393 (2011).
81. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 49-50.
82. Id. at 26, 34.
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ignorance,"8 or "original position," approach, where any federal
constitutional changes are delayed to the point where there is no clear
partisan advantage that can be discerned.84
Professor Levinson's proposal is radical because it is "extralegal" and
beyond the "rules laid down" in Article V of the federal Constitution. It also
raises the fears of those who oppose even a constitutional convention within
the terms of Article V, not only because they fear what such a convention
might propose, but also because they fear a "runaway" convention like that in
1787. These are widespread and deeply held concerns. For that reason,
Professor Levinson might have delved even further into the state
constitutional experience with the processes of amendment and revision. For
example, a number of states have provided in their constitutions for an
automatic, periodic vote on whether to call a state constitutional
convention. Article V could be amended to provide for this or some variant
of it.
In fact, my colleague Alan Tarr and I have pointed out that there is an
extremely wide range of state constitutional amendment and revision
procedures that have been or could be used in the states to accomplish
needed constitutional change. New approaches had to be, and have been,
developed at the state level to deal with the problem of state constitutional
rigidity. A number of these approaches could be tailored to fit a perceived
need for change in the federal Constitution without the fear of a runaway
convention. For example, several states have utilized a "two-step process" to
achieve needed amendment or revision in their state constitutions." The
first, more moderate step is to formally change the "rules laid down" by
initially following the established process for a constitutional amendment
that authorizes a new, even one-time, process for amendment or revision of
the state constitution.88 Why not consider this approach, now, at the federal
83. Id. at 33-34.
84. Id. at 26, 33-34.
85. See generally John Dinan, The Political Dynamics of Mandatory State Constitutional
Convention Referendums: Lessons from the 2000s Regarding Obstacles and Pathways to Their
Passage, 71 MONT. L. REV. 395 (2010) (discussing the fourteen states that provide for a mandatory
convention referendum device in their constitutions and examining the constitutional referendums
held in Iowa, Alaska, Missouri, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Hawaii, and Illinois).
86. See generally 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE POLITICS
OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra note 65 (analyzing the political obstacles to state
constitutional reform through case studies of reform efforts in Alabama, California, Colorado,
Florida, New York, and Virginia); G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Getting from
Here to There: Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional
Reform, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075 (2005) (encouraging state constitutional reformers to take advantage
of the numerous available options for reforming their constitutions); Robert F. Williams, Should the
Oregon Constitution Be Revised, and If So, How Should It Be Accomplished?, 87 OR. L. REV. 867
(2008) [hereinafter Williams, Oregon) (examining the Oregon Constitution and efforts to revise it
and discussing state constitution revision generally).




level? For example, in Michigan, a 1960 first-step amendment eased the
requirements for calling a constitutional convention, leading to the successful
1961-1962 Constitutional Convention." A similar first-step amendment was
adopted in 1950 in Illinois, leading to that state's well-regarded 1970
Constitution." Texas amended its constitution to authorize the Legislature to
sit as a constitutional convention for one time only. 9' Although the
convention's proposals failed to get the necessary votes to be proposed to the
voting public, 92 this was an innovative mechanism. New York used, albeit
unsuccessfully, a Temporary Commission that proposed (based on the
federal military base closing commission) "a unique action-producing
alternative to a state constitutional convention," where the Governor and
legislature were urged to act on proposed constitutional amendments and
statutes by a date certain. 93
Again, one of the fears about federal constitutional amendment and
revision concerns the legal ability to limit a federal constitutional convention.
The experience in the states over the years, however, has indicated that
limited state constitutional conventions have been successful in taking "hot
button" topics off of the table, and those limits have been seen as legally
enforceable. An initial step at the federal level could be to propose an
amendment to Article V that clearly provides for a legally enforceable
limited constitutional convention, whether on a one-time basis (in response to
a perceived crisis or to limit opposition), with its use limited to periodic
intervals, or as a permanent amendment to Article V. This would have to be
drafted with care, providing a mechanism for determining and enforcing such
limitations, processes for choosing delegates, etc. In the states, the
objective of a limited convention has been achieved by submitting not only
the question whether to have a constitutional convention, but also how such a
convention should be limited, to the voters themselves. In this way, the
limitations are seen as emanating from the people themselves when they vote
to call a constitutional convention, therefore binding their delegates.9 6 A
similar mechanism could be included in such a limited constitutional
convention amendment to Article V, thereby eliminating the possibility of a
runaway convention. This two-step approach would solidify the legality of
new federal amendment or revision procedures by actually changing the
89. Williams, Oregon, supra note 86, at 882.
90. Id. at 884-85. The Florida Legislature successfully proposed an entirely revised
constitution in 1967. Id. at 891.
91. Id. at 888.
92. Id. at 888-89.
93. Tarr & Williams, supra note 86, at 1095; Williams, Oregon, supra note 86, at 894.
94. Tarr & Williams, supra note 86, at 1085-92.
95. See generally Richard Briffault, Electing Delegates to a State Constitutional Convention:
Some Legal and Policy Issues, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1125 (2005) (addressing constitutional
requirements for delegate selection and considering alternative delegate selection methods).
96. Tarr & Williams, supra note 86, at 1087-88.
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"rules laid down" prospectively, before the new procedures are utilized.
Then, the second stage would not be extralegal and could be carried out in a
much more moderate and less uncertain process than an unlimited federal
constitutional convention. An appointed constitutional commission,
described below as a matter of state constitutional practice, could make
important preparatory recommendations and provide background research
and training for the delegates to such a limited federal constitutional
convention.
There are a variety of additional techniques that have been developed or
suggested in the state constitutional context that might be tailored for use at
the federal level. For example, amendments have been proposed with
"sunset" provisions limiting their length of effectiveness, shifting the burden
to those who want to continue them at their point of expiration from those
who want to eliminate them.97 There is, of course, already federal precedent
for this in the clause prohibiting Congress from banning the international
slave trade until a date certain.98  Professor Levinson's suggestion of
delaying the effective dates of changes, so that partisan advantage cannot be
weighed,99 is also very important. A variation on the sunset approach would
be constitutional amendments that, after a period of time, may be changed by
less onerous amendment procedures or even by statute, possibly by
supermajority.' 00
During the last century, states have had much success with the use of
constitutional commissions, which are appointed bodies of experts who
prepare proposed changes to the state constitutions and submit them to state
legislatures.o10  This commission mechanism, not included in state
constitutional amendment and revision procedures, has been developed in the
states as an alternative to (or sometimes in preparation for) constitutional
conventions, because they cost much less, rely on expertise, and report back
to the legislative branch, which can thereby maintain control of the
submission of state constitutional amendments or revisions to the
electorate.10 2 Commissions have been criticized, on the other hand, because
they do not rely on the involvement of elected delegates the way
constitutional conventions do, and therefore have been described as
undemocratic. 103 Despite these drawbacks, the commission mechanism that
has been developed successfully in the states could certainly be adapted for
97. Id. at 1113-14.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
99. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 26-27.
100. Tarr & Williams, supra note 86, at 1114-15.
101. Id. at 1094-100.
102. See id. at 1094-95 (characterizing commissions as providing expert opinions while
preserving ultimate authority with the legislature).
103. Id. at 1099.
2013] 1161
Texas Law Review
use at the federal level. This would be a moderate approach and would not
require an amendment to Article V or operate in defiance of it.
Almost all state constitutional commissions have operated without any
formal change to the "rules laid down" for state constitutional amendment or
revision. This is an unnecessary step because the commissions' proposed
amendments or revisions are submitted to the legislative branch for its
consideration pursuant to the formal processes of state constitutional change
that are already in place.104 So, the use of an appointed commission, broadly
representative but utilizing expertise, might be able to examine some of the
"settled" provisions of the federal Constitution that Professor Levinson
describes as dysfunctional and contributing to the current gridlock in our
federal government. Compromise would be necessary here, as it is in all
constitution making. Thinking of constitutional commissions somewhat
differently, one could be utilized to advise Congress on how to propose an
amendment or amendments to Article V that would authorize limited
constitutional conventions, what the limits should be, and how to make such
limits legally enforceable. A commission was used recently in New Jersey
for this purpose.10 '
One of the keys to the success of state constitutional revision has been
moderation.' 06 State constitutional conventions and commissions that have
attempted to do too much, or to accomplish radical change, have often ended
in failure. 07 Therefore, any proposed method of amendment or revision of
the federal Constitution should aim for moderation. Some improvement is
better than none. Levinson recognizes that "the best works as an enemy of
the good." 08 It may be that reasonable and moderate adjustments to some of
the "settled" provisions of the federal Constitution, such as the Inauguration
Clause (probably not two Senators, per state), would not be nearly as
controversial as proposed changes to other parts of the Constitution of
Conversation. A limited federal constitutional convention, or constitutional
commission, might be structured to focus only on the Constitution of
Settlement and not be permitted to consider the more controversial
Constitution of Conversation.
104. The one exception to this is Florida, where the state constitution creates two appointed
commissions that meet periodically and can submit their proposed revisions directly to the voters.
Rebecca Mae Salokar, Constitutional Revision in Florida: Planning, Politics, Policy, and Publicity,
in I STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra note 65, at 19, 19; Robert F. Williams, The Florida Constitution
Revision Commission in Historic and National Context, 50 FLA. L. REV. 215, 220 (1998); Robert F.
Williams, Foreword: Is Constitutional Revision Success Worth Its Popular Sovereignty Price?, 52
FLA. L. REV. 249, 252 (2000); Williams, Oregon, supra note 86, at 891-93.
105. Tarr & Williams, supra note 86, at 1104-05; see also Williams, Oregon, supra note 86, at
884 (describing similar use of a commission in Illinois).
106. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 378.
107. Salokar, supra note 104, at 39-40; Williams, Oregon, supra note 86, at 892.
108. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 391.
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A careful evaluation of the defects in the Constitution of Settlement,
described by Professor Levinson, must consider whether the individual
defects could be remedied by a series of unrelated amendments, or rather the
defects are so interrelated as to render the federal Constitution incoherent and
in need of more extensive revision rather than mere amendment. Alan Tarr
noted that:
Of course, it is possible to introduce significant constitutional reform
without calling a convention or adopting a new constitution-
amendments proposed by constitutional commissions, by initiative, or
by state legislatures may also produce constitutional reform. But in
thinking about constitutional reform, it is important to distinguish it
from the ordinary constitutional change that is so prevalent in the
states. Any alteration of a state constitution, no matter how technical
or minor, qualifies as constitutional change. In contrast, constitutional
reform involves a more fundamental reconsideration of constitutional
foundations. It introduces changes of considerable breadth and
impact, changes that substantially affect the operation of state
government or the public policy of the state. The replacement of one
constitution by another obviously qualifies as constitutional reform.
So too may major constitutional amendments or interconnected sets of
amendments. However, most constitutional change in the states does
not qualify.'0o
Many people, as Levinson acknowledges, "are basically terrified" of a
federal constitutional convention."o This fear also now manifests itself at the
state constitutional level, where political scientists Gerald Benjamin and
Thomas Gais have observed what they call "conventionphobia."" Calls for
state constitutional conventions are now routinely defeated by the voters. I
have said:
109. G. Alan Tarr, Introduction to 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra note 65, at 1, 2 (footnote
omitted). As Bruce Cain has noted:
In theory, constitutional revision should be more comprehensive and qualitatively
more significant than a constitutional amendment. But what if revision occurs
increasingly through amendment: What is gained and what is lost? The most important
advantage should lie in the ability of a Revision Commission to consider how all the
pieces fit together. Where the amendment process is piecemeal and sequential, the
revision process affords the opportunity to logically relate proposals to goals, and to
make the entire package of proposal[s] coherent.
Bruce E. Cain, Constitutional Revision in California: The Triumph of Amendment over Revision, in
I STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra note 65, at 59, 64.
110. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 2, at 392.
111. Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, Constitutional Conventionphobia, I HOFSTRA L. &
POL'Y SYMP. 53, 69-70 (1996); Thomas Gais & Gerald Benjamin, Public Discontent and the




The public seems to view a constitutional convention as political
business as usual by the "government industry." Constitutional
conventions seem to have lost their legitimacy in the public mind. At
the time many states' original constitutions were drafted, the
politicians and special interests were afraid of the people acting
through constitutional conventions. Now, by contrast, the people are
afraid of politicians and special interests acting through constitutional
conventions.112
This is certainly an attitude that will provide additional resistance to
Professor Levinson's proposal, but which might not reject more moderate
approaches out of hand.
Sandy Levinson has made important, and often convincing, criticisms of
provisions of our Constitution that are not often debated. His proposed
remedy, however, is radical, and in many people's view, dangerous to our
federal constitutional system. For readers who agree with some of his
criticisms, but worry about an extralegal, unlimited federal constitutional
convention (or even a legal convention under Article V), the lessons learned
from state constitutional amendment processes may be much more practical,
moderate, and comforting.
Those seriously seeking to resolve at least some of the difficulties we
currently experience because of the "settled" provisions of the federal
Constitution would be wise to pick and choose among the lessons from the
states to develop realistic possibilities for moderate change at the federal
constitutional level. After all, despite the fact that most people think our
Constitution has served us very well, it seems clear now that it could
certainly be improved upon. Possibly now is the time that Article V should
be made ("framed") to serve us rather than us having to serve (be "framed"
by) Article V.
112. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 388 (footnote omitted).
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THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW. Edited by loannis Lianos &
D. Daniel Sokol. Stanford University Press, 2012. 288 pages. $50.00.
Reviewed by Barak Orbach*
About thirty years ago, Professor Frank Easterbrook published his
seminal article, The Limits of Antitrust, in the Texas Law Review.'
Easterbrook declared that "[t]he goal of antitrust is to perfect the operation of
competitive markets," 2 and concluded that "[a]ntitrust is an imperfect tool for
the regulation of competition."3 It is an imperfect tool, he explained,
"because we rarely know the right amount of competition there should be,
because neither judges nor juries are particularly good at handling complex
economic arguments, and because many plaintiffs are interested in
restraining rather than promoting competition."4
Since Easterbrook published his article, the intellectual resources
invested in antitrust in the United States have been in decline (see Figure 1).
Easterbrook wrote about institutional and conceptual limits of antitrust-the
internal limits of antitrust. Others have addressed the extrinsic limits of
antitrust-the relationships of antitrust with other areas of law, such as
intellectual property and regulation.5 The decrease in depth of antitrust
writing introduced a new form of limits in antitrust: diminishing critique and
intellectual development in the field. This is the depth limit of antitrust. Of
course, one may argue that there is no need for antitrust enforcement or
antitrust scholarship, or at least no need for much.6  Such arguments,
however, tend to reflect general objections to regulation that have their own
* Professor of Law, The University of Arizona College of Law.
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEXAs L. REV. 1 (1984).
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id. at 39.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation, in ECONOMIC
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? (Nancy L. Rose ed., forthcoming) (on
file with the author); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1813, 1816-18 (1984) (proposing a new framework for balancing the inherent conflict
between trade restrictions provided for by patent law and prohibited by antitrust law).
6. See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer
Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2003) ("We find little empirical evidence
that past [antitrust] interventions have provided much direct benefit to consumers or significantly
deterred anticompetitive behavior."); Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Antitrust Anticompetitive?, 9 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 277, 336 (1986) ("Given the long history of antitrust law and its contempt for
true market rivalry, perhaps the most effective proconsumer program would be to consider federal
enforcement of the antitrust laws to be a per se restraint of trade.").
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social costs.7 They often rely on "fire of truth" theories that no knowledge or
analysis can possibly challenge.8 The oversimplicity of such "fire of truth"
arguments has been burdening antitrust for too long.
Figure .






Ioannis Lianos and Daniel Sokol's The Global Limits of Competition
Law (GLCL) is the first book in a series intending to develop antitrust
scholarship.10 GLCL's "starting point [is] the intrinsic limits of competition
law that Judge Frank Easterbrook highlighted."" The purpose of the book is
to explore a broad set of limits to competition laws, "some intrinsic to
antitrust, others extrinsic."1 2 By definition, antitrust scholarship, including
scholarship about the limits of antitrust, expands the depth limits of antitrust.
7. For a critique of those general objections to regulation, see generally BARAK ORBACH,
REGULATION: WHY AND How THE STATE REGULATES (2012). See also Barak Orbach, What Is
Regulation?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 1, 9-10 (2013) [hereinafter Orbach, What Is Regulation?]
(arguing that the preponderance of irrational, ideological positions on regulation obstruct a more
productive approach that acknowledges regulation's strengths and weaknesses); Barak Orbach, How
Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253 (2013) [hereinafter Orbach, How Antitrust Lost
Its Goal] (describing the reflection of the trend against regulation in antitrust); Thomas Philippon &
Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Finance Industry: 1909-2006, 127 Q.J. ECON.
1551 (2012) (finding correlation between deregulation and substantial wage premiums in the
financial industry).
8. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at
Chicago 1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163, 183 (1983) (reproducing a discussion among leaders of
the Chicago School, who compare their experiences with the movement to "religious conversion");
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 216 (1985)
("[N]othing-not even an intellectual structure as imposing as the Chicago School-lasts forever.").
9. For the methodology and its limitations, see Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., Quantitative
Analysis ofCulture Using Millions ofDigitized Books, 331 SCIENCE 176 (2011).
10. THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW (loannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2012)
[hereinafter GLCL].
11. loannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol, Introduction, in GLCL, supra note 10, at 1, 1.
12. Id.
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GLCL is a book about competition laws, known in the United States as
antitrust. 3 The book examines "competition laws" as a concept. It consists
of fifteen essays written by prominent antitrust scholars. As a collection of
essays, GLCL presents complementary perspectives of today's limits of
antitrust.
The understanding of GLCL requires some appreciation of the
simplicity and hospitality traditions in antitrust. The simplicity tradition
refers to the tendency of individuals to view markets, businesses, and
business practices either as competitive or as anticompetitive. That is, the
individual simplifies facts and realities in a manner that allows her to
consistently reach the same conclusion about competitiveness. In The Limits
of Antitrust, Frank Easterbrook described the "inhospitality tradition" as
"[t]he tradition [in which] judges view each business practice with suspicion,
always wondering how firms are using it to harm consumers. If the
defendant cannot convince the judge that its practices are an essential feature
of competition, the judge forbids their use."l4
GLCL's essays shed light about the complexities of reality effectively
rejecting the simplicity and hospitality traditions. As Herbert Hovenkamp
sums up in his essay: "extremes [in] antitrust policy should [be] avoid[ed].""
Easterbrook's The Limits of Antitrust is a seminal article that, unlike
ordinary academic works, has survived developments in time and is still
relevant. 16 Being a Chicago School disciple, Easterbrook presented a
taxonomy of antitrust errors, arguing that if we "let some socially undesirable
practices escape, the cost is bearable," 17 while the "costs of deterring
beneficial conduct (a byproduct of any search for the undesirable examples)
are high."8 This taxonomy was insightful as an instrument against the
"inhospitality tradition of antitrust."
Easterbrook's taxonomy, however, is simple and may backfire under the
antithetical tradition where judges perceive the marketplace as the cure for all
problems and government intervention as the source of all problems. The
taxonomy was helpful for certain things, but it reflects the simplicity
tradition in antitrust. To illustrate, consider judges who endorse the Chicago
13. For the significance of the label "antitrust," see Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling,
The Antitrust Curse ofBigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2012).
14. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 14. Easterbrook attributed the phrase to Donald Turner. Id. at
4. While heading the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice, Turner described the
"inhospitality in the tradition of antitrust law." Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust,
1966 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 1, 1-2. The phrases "a tradition of inhospitality" and
"inhospitality in a tradition" are not equivalent, of course.
15. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Close Look: Transaction Cost Economics in Com-
petition Policy, in GLCL, supra note 10, at 66, 80.
16. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Easterbrook On Errors, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 11,
12-13 (2010) (highlighting the large number of citations to Easterbrook's article in cases and
secondary sources as evidence of its success).
17. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 14.
18. Id. at 15.
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tradition at its extreme. 9 For example, in 1979, relying on a dubious study
written in the Chicago tradition, the Supreme Court stated that the goal of
antitrust is "consumer welfare." 20  The U.S. Supreme Court has never
examined the standard, yet it keeps using it.21
While antitrust has many limits, studies show that human
overconfidence tends to have fewer limits. People tend to be dismissive of
and reject information that conflicts with their own beliefs.22 Specifically,
people who hold strong opinions are likely to evaluate facts and empirical
evidence in a biased manner.23 This well-documented tendency has profound
effects on communication and political polarization.24 It also explains the
simplicity tradition in antitrust. An influential article, which argues that
action is costly but inaction is bearable, may become immortal for those who
want to believe that, notwithstanding evidence to the contrary, government
action is costly. That is, a study of policy limits may establish limits, if the
study forms a belief that problems solve themselves, while policies cause
problems.
19. For a discussion of this culture in courts, see generally Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory
and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1039 (1997).
20. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). See generally Barak Orbach, The
Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & EcON. 133 (2011) (chronicling the
academic and judicial confusion with respect to the meaning of consumer welfare).
21. See generally Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, supra note 7.
22. See generally Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954) (explaining divergent perceptions of violence in a
football game corresponding to team identification with the proposition that from the total array of
possible perceptions, viewers select those which they understand as significant); Hugo Mercier &
Dan Sperber, Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory, 34 BEHAV. &
BRAIN ScI. 57 (2011) (reevaluating the function of human reasoning to account for the fact that
people typically ignore arguments that do not support their own views); Raymond S. Nickerson,
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998)
(marshaling evidence demonstrating the strength of confirmation bias).
23. See generally Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The
Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979) (finding that people who hold strong opinions on complex social issues fail
to give equal weight to confirming and disconfirming evidence).
24. See generally James Andreoni & Tymofiy Mylovanov, Diverging Opinions, 4 AM. ECON.
J.: MICROECONOMICS 209 (2012) (noting the limited effectiveness of communication due to
persistence of disagreement even in the face of sufficient information to reach agreement); Roland
B6nabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation, 117 Q.J. ECON. 871 (2002)
(examining how self-serving beliefs factor into internal, intrapersonal communication); Avinash K.
Dixit & Jorgen W. Weibull, Political Polarization, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 7351 (2007)
(offering an explanation of how voter processing of information can result in polarization of the
electorate); Barak Orbach & Frances R. Sjoberg, Excessive Speech, Civility Norms, and the
Clucking Theorem, 44 CONN. L. REv. 1 (2011) (arguing that extraneous societal communication
imposes costs that impede beneficial changes); Barak Orbach, On Hubris, Civility, and Incivility, 54
ARIZ. L. REV. 443 (2012) (questioning the effectiveness of certain social norms purportedly
designed to encourage openness to differing viewpoints); Rajiv Sethi & Muhamet Yildiz, Public
Disagreement, 4 AM. EcoN. J.: MICROECONOMICs 57 (2012) (suggesting that communication in
certain societies can serve to magnify existing biases and to create new biases where none
previously existed).
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Scholarship, antitrust scholarship included, has its own limits. This is
why we should be concerned about the depth limits of antitrust. GLCL is an
important book for its survey of the constraints of antitrust. The works in the
book explain how antitrust can work in the real world when constraints exist.
Under the simplistic tradition, the government is the primary source of
constraints, and we should "let some socially undesirable practices escape
[because] the cost is bearable."25 In the real world, however, there are
several sources of constraints: transaction costs, inadequate information,
preferences for differentiation, bounded rationality, and fallibility. Antitrust
as a form of government regulation is needed to address the way market
participants utilize these constraints or to evaluate the effects of these
constraints on business conduct. The imperfections of antitrust, its intrinsic
limits, are a byproduct of these constraints.26
GLCL explores some of the complexities of managing antitrust in the
real world. The book includes three essays about the institutional design of
antitrust. Javier Tapia and Santiago Montt describe the relationships between
courts and competition agencies.27 Fr6d6ric Jenny analyzes the significance
of independency and advocacy for the work of competition agencies. 28
loannis Lianos describes the misunderstanding of antitrust remedies. 29
GLCL includes four essays on the intrinsic limits of antitrust. George
Priest explains the intellectual foundation of Easterbrook's The Limits of
Antitrust in the Chicago School tradition.30 Herbert Hovenkamp describes
the relationships among several schools of thoughts in antitrust, focusing on
transaction cost economics, which is related to the Chicago School of
antitrust.3' Hovenkamp's review stresses the need for depth in antitrust,
describing several points of stagnation.32 Jeffrey Harrison presents the
challenges of competition policy in addressing the powerful buyers.33 Anne-
Lise Sibony reviews the challenges of the legal institution to properly utilize
25. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 14.
26. Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, supra note 7. See generally Orbach, What Is Regula-
tion?, supra note 7 (observing that imperfect regulation is a necessary consequence of human
limitation).
27. Javier Tapia & Santiago Montt, Judicial Scrutiny and Competition Authorities: The Institu-
tional Limits ofAntitrust, in GLCL,supra note 10, at 141.
28. Fr6d6ric Jenny, Competition Authorities: Independence and Advocacy, in GLCL, supra note
10, at 158.
29. loannis Lianos, Competition Law Remedies: In Search of a Theory, in GLCL, supra note
10, at 177.
30. George L. Priest, The Limits ofAntitrust and the Chicago School Tradition, in GLCL, supra
note 10, at 15.
31. Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 66.
32. Id.
33. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Complications in the Antitrust Response to Monopsony, in GLCL,
supra note 10, at 54.
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economics. 34 In some ways, her essay explains the spirit of the simplistic
tradition.
Like most distinctions, the distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic
limits of antitrust is somewhat artificial. These limits are interrelated and
define each other. The internal strengths and weaknesses of competition
policies influence their reach, while other legal regimes and policies external
to antitrust influence the effectiveness of competition policies.
GLCL's essays on the extrinsic limits of antitrust illustrate this point.
Daniel Sokol reviews the effects of government policies on the strength of
antitrust policy, focusing on regulatory regimes that weaken antitrust. 3 5
Damien Gerard's essay describes one form of such regulatory policies: the
state action doctrine in Europe. 36 Daniel Crane describes choices of litigants
between antitrust and intellectual property, considering the limits of each
area of law.3 And Paolisa Nebbia describes the relationships between
competition law and consumer protection. One of the central debates in
antitrust is whether the law serves (or ought to serve) as a means for
consumer protection, or whether consumer protection is outside the limits of
the field.
GLCL does not explore or even present all the limits of antitrust. The
book offers fifteen perspectives of certain limits. It should be understood as
a book that seeks to challenge the present depth limits of antitrust by offering
important antitrust contributions. As such, GLCL is indeed an important
antitrust book.
Contrary to Easterbrook's statement, the goal of antitrust is not "to
perfect the operation of competitive markets."40 Perfection has never been
the goal of antitrust, and it should not be the goal of any policy.4 1 Perfection
is also not a trait of scholarship. But antitrust scholarship is too often a
messanger of the tradition of hospitality in antitrust. GLCL is a successful
collective effort to explain the depth needed in antitrust.
34. Anne-Lise Sibony, Limits of Imports from Economics into Competition Law, in GLCL,
supra note 10, at 39.
35. D. Daniel Sokol, Anticompetitive Government Regulation, in GLCL, supra note 10, at 83.
36. Damien M.B. Gerard, A Global Perspective on State Action, in GLCL, supra note 10, at 99.
37. Daniel A. Crane, IP's Advantages over Antitrust, in GLCL, supra note 10, at 117.
38. Paolisa Nebbia, Competition Law and Consumer Protection Against Unfair Commercial
Practices: A More-than-Complementary Relationship?, in GLCL, supra note 10, at 127.
39. For the controversy on consumer protection in antitrust, see John B. Kirkwood, Protecting
Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct: The Goal With the Widest Support,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425 (2013); Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of
Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503 (2001); Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of
the Antitrust Statutes: Efficiency, Wealth Transfers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2349 (2013); and Joshua Wright & Douglas Ginsburg, The Goals ofAntitrust: Why Welfare Trumps
Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2405 (2013).
40. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 1.
41. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION (1993).
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Stirring the Melting Pot: A Recipe for Immigrant
Acceptance
THE IMMIGRATION CRUCIBLE: TRANSFORMING RACE, NATION, AND THE
LIMITS OF THE LAW. By Philip Kretsedemas. New York, New York:
Columbia University Press, 2012. 232 pages. $28.00.
Reviewed by Michael Scaperlanda*
The interstate highway "made distant what had been close, and close
what had been distant."
In The Immigration Crucible, Philip Kretsedemas hopes to break the
"habit of developing arguments that are simply reactions to the 'other side"' 2
and desires to "map a political, cultural, and economic terrain that ...
provides some new insights into why so many noncitizens are in a difficult
situation" 3 while drawing "attention to the limitations of the mainstream
proimmigration position."4 Toward this end, he seeks "an engagement across
lines of difference that has the potential to transform the perspectives of all
parties ... involved in the encounter."5 In this spirit, I offer my critique of
this challenging book. I share Kretsedemas's sentiment-if my Review "is
successful in getting people to think about U.S. immigration policy in a new
way, ... I will be more than pleased. Either way, I have put forward my best
effort." 6
Kretsedemas ultimately fails in his task because as much as he tries to
escape-to transcend-liberal anthropology with its peculiar notions of the
state and the state's relationship to immigrants and other denizens, he
remains within liberalism's orbit, pulled in by its unseen gravitational forces.
Instead of providing "a paradigm shift" that leads to "an entirely new
understanding,"'7 he offers a particular view of the terrain from a worn and
aging neoliberal spacecraft.
This Review will proceed in five stages. First, I will provide a brief
summary of the book. Second, I will offer three critiques: (a) Kretsedemas's
* Gene and Elaine Edwards Family Chair in Law and Associate Dean for Academics,
University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. WENDELL BERRY, JAYBER CROW 281 (2000).
2. PHILIP KRETSEDEMAS, THE IMMIGRATION CRUCIBLE XII (2012).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 148. "Instead of retreating from the public debate-or simply tolerating the status
quo-more effort should be made to open up and pluralize this field of debate." Id. at 147.
6. Id. at XV.
7. Id. at 151.
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creation of a stereotyped "Other," which he marginalizes and stigmatizes,
undermines his call to transformational dialogue; (b) while decrying both
Executive discretion and state control over immigration, he fails to recognize
and therefore leaves unresolved the question of how immigration policy
ought to be adopted and implemented; and (c) although he desires a "stronger
ethical foundation" for the pro-immigration discourse, he offers none.'
Finally, I will offer a brief response to the central theme of his book, which is
a desire "to address the problem of immigrant marginality."9
I. The Book: A Summary
Even though Jim Crow is now a closed chapter in U.S. legal
history, there is still a romantic attachment within the popular culture
to images of national community that stem from this era.io
Kretsedemas believes that images of national community formed in the
Jim Crow era drive immigration policy, fostering structures and institutions
that create immigrant alienation. He hopes his book project will serve as a
vehicle for "transforming the political culture to make it more inclusive of
new immigrant populations."" To succeed, his project "requires a critical
race analysis . .. that is not just oriented toward fixing racial inequalities" but
also displays "a willingness to examine and reconstruct popular ideas about
whiteness and the cultural difference of immigrants."' 2
Three key factors enter into Kretsedemas's equation: the marginal
immigrant, the state with its broad discretionary powers, and the
acquiescence of a broad spectrum of intellectuals-"liberal, conservative,
and Marxist"-in the status quo.' 3 The introductory chapter provides a broad
overview of his case stating that both pro- and anti-immigrant forces have
worked to expand the "extralegal (or marginally legal) discretionary powers"
of the state, which sometimes favor "liberalization of migrant flows" and at
other times serve "to control racial minority populations."l 4
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id.
10. Id at 151. He uses Jim Crow as a rhetorical device recognizing that there are significant
distinctions between Jim Crow and the current immigration landscape. E.g., id. at 87 ("[Ilt does not
appear that Latino migrants are being treated like a separate racial caste, as was the case for black
populations during Jim Crow."); id. at 83 ("The exclusion of the black person under Jim Crow was
justified by their so-called racial difference. The exclusion of the undocumented migrant, on the
other hand, is justified by the fact of their unauthorized entry.").
11. Id. at 150. He also hopes that this project is "connected to a broader project of regenerating
a political culture that does a better job of including and safeguarding the rights of the entire U.S.
population." Id.
12. Id. "Unfortunately, the postracial rhetoric of the Obana era has made this already difficult
task even more daunting" because the "subtle message sent by Obama's campaign speeches is that
systemic racial inequalities can be addressed, in a way that avoids divisive racial politics." Id. at
150-51.
13. Id. at 130.
14. Id. at 8.
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Rejecting-or at least deemphasizing-formal "legal categories ...
defined by the state,"15 Kretsedemas uses Chapter Two to reimagine many
noncitizens, many nonimmigrants, the undocumented, 6  and even some
immigrants, 7 as "de facto stateless."' 8  With respect to nonimmigrants, he
emphasizes the changing nature of arrivals to the United States: in the early
twentieth century the immigration flow dwarfed the nonimmigrant flow but
today the nonimmigrant flow is thirty times greater than the immigration
flow.'9 The increase in the number of nonimmigrants, Kretsedemas suggests,
makes it possible to expand the pool of noncitizen workers without the
political cost of increasing immigration2 0 with the corollary benefit that this
population can be controlled through the government's "security-
enforcement apparatus." 2 1 De facto statelessness befalls a segment of
nonimmigrant visa holders because many of these "persons enter with
dependents and with an intent to settle," with the nonimmigrant visa serving
as "a probationary legal status." 22
15. Id. at 13.
16. Id. at 44 ('"[I]llegality'-a more dire kind of statelessness."). "[I]ilegality has become the
organizing framework for recruiting and regulating the workforce." Id. at 31.
17. Id. at 43 (discussing a case of denaturalization and then deportation).
18. E.g., id. at 19 ("The recent literature on statelessness has made a deliberate effort at
complicating the relationship between statelessness as a formal, legal-juridical status and
statelessness as a sociopolitical condition."). Toward what end? In this view, "victims of hurricane
Katrina" and those citizens "subjected to warrantless searches" are de facto stateless because they
"are subject to the law but not protected by the law." Id. at 20-21. This deliberate jettisoning of
legal-juridical categories obfuscates the plight of and duties owed to two very different kinds of
marginalized persons. In this era of the nation-state, the truly stateless person finds herself without
the benefit of a nation-state that in some sense owes allegiance to her just as she, in a reciprocal
manner, owes allegiance to her country. The claim of the Katrina victim or the citizen subjected to
warrantless search is very different. It is that the nation-state that owes her its allegiance and
protection has failed in its duty to administer justice.
19. Id. at 17.
20. Id. at 21.
21. Id. at 34-35. Kretsedemas focuses on the wrong ratios in the narrative because visitors-
overwhelmingly tourists-make up the vast majority of nonimmigrant arrivals. His analysis would
be tighter if he focused on the ratios between temporary workers and immigrants. In 2009, the last
year he deals with, 1.13 million people were granted permanent residence. U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., 2010 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 5 (2011), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statisticslyearbook/2010/oisyb_2010.pdf. In that year,
1.7 million temporary workers (and their families) entered the United States out of 36.2 million
nonimmigrant 1-94 admissions. Id. at 65. After refocusing, the ratio is reduced from 30:1 to 1.5:1.
In drawing his conclusions, Kretsedemas also fails to address the changes in travel between 1909
and 2009 and how that alone may account for a shift in the ratio.
22. KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at 17-18. Kretsedemas fails to address two obvious sets of
questions. First, is a nonimmigrant who can return to his country of citizenship really "stateless?"
If he is, as Kretsedemas seems to assume, why? Second, most nonimmigrant visa holders must by
law have nonimmigrant intent and have a foreign residence that they have "no intention of
abandoning." E.g., 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2006). What responsibility does the
nonimmigrant visa holder bear for her situation? Should fraud in the visa application have
consequences, including deportation?
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Chapter Three reviews "the expansion of executive authority within the
U.S. presidency" to "explain how this expanded authority has been used to
craft immigration policy."23 Kretsedemas notes that Executive discretion
grew out of necessity to manage crises but that beginning with President
Theodore Roosevelt the Executive began to exercise discretion "in an active,
creative way" and not merely in reaction to external conditions or events.24
Discretion unleashed can be used to expand or restrict rights.25
Kretsedemas's thesis plays out, sometimes in unexpected ways, in the arena
of immigration enforcement. For example, "Despite the fact that Democratic
administrations are often viewed as being more proimmigrant than
Republican administrations, [they] have actually been tougher on border
control and immigration enforcement."2 6 Far from being an accumulation of
power in the Executive, expanded discretion-at least in American history-
has a devolutionary component where private entities and local governments
share in this discretion.2 7
In Chapter Four, Kretsedemas links the expansion of Executive
discretionary authority with recent growth in local enforcement of
immigration law, which "has produced a situation in which police officers,
landlords, election booth workers, and health care workers have been given
more freedom to participate in enforcement practices that used to be regarded
as the exclusive preserve of the federal immigration system. Drawing a
23. KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at 49. The Obama administration's decision to provide
"certain young people sometimes called 'Dreamers' legal protection despite their undocumented
status provides a perfect example of an Executive's exercise of discretion. See President Barack
Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/I5/remarks-president-immigration
(highlighting that the announced policies on immigration enforcement came "[i]n the absence of
any immigration action from Congress"); see also Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Sec., to David Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al.
(June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (setting forth guidelines for enforcing the
Administration's policy of providing protection for those who came to the United States as children,
thus "exercis[ing] discretion within the framework of the existing law").
24. KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at 54 ("In these situations, the executive officer is no longer
reacting to unforeseen, calamitous events. It begins to craft the definition of 'emergency
conditions' in ways that complement its ideology, strategic interests, and specific policy
objectives.").
25. Id at 63. For example the immigrant-welcoming Bracero program and the immigration-
restrictionist Operation Wetback "were both creatures of discretionary executive authority." Id. at
68 (arguing that both programs are more about the labor market and less about transnational
migration).
26. Id. at 66.
27. Id. at 61.
28. Id. at 73 ("[L]ocal immigration laws have allowed the authority of the federal government
to be parceled out to a variety of state and nonstate actors."). Kretsedemas's argument would have
been more powerful if he had acknowledged the nuanced and complex historical relationship
between federal, state, and nonstate actors in enforcing United States immigration laws. See, e.g.,
Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L.
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parallel between local enforcement of immigration laws and Jim Crow laws,
he argues that both provided a strategy for integrating the marginalized group
into the economy while maintaining their status as inferior beings. 29 And he
sees masked racism behind much of the local immigration law enforcement
movement.
For Kretsedemas, immigration laws, like Jim Crow laws, provide an
example of the ways that local governance is "bound up with the symbolic
politics of the majority group identity."3 Chapter Five, therefore, leaves the
practical world of laws and governance to explore the intellectual world
where scholars from multiple ideological schools have converged to lay a
foundation that fails to support adequately legal and cultural structures that
welcome the immigrant.32 Through a convergence of "liberal, conservative,
and Marxist intellectuals," governing strategies that lead to immigrant
alienation have "been quietly reinforced by both sides of the debate over
immigration policy."3 3  Strands of liberalism, for example, unwittingly
collude with "racist ideologies" by promoting a pragmatic "cost-benefit
rationality that becomes invested in perpetuating" inequality.34
The book's conclusion reveals the marginalized immigrant as a
symbolic representative of all who live on the margins of American life.
As an important step toward eliminating immigrant (and others') alienation,
Kretsedemas desires an "informed public dialogue" on immigration, "the
meaning of democracy, national identity, and the continuing legacy of race in
REv. 1833, 1873-74 (1993) (noting that the states, enlisting the aid of private individuals, including
ship captains, controlled immigration for the United States' first century).
29. KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at 84-85. "Like Jim Crow, these laws may be viewed as an
exercise in coercive integration that secures a place for most noncitizens in the U.S. socioeconomic
order, but in a way that underlines the inferior legal and social status of unauthorized and low wage
migrant populations." Id. at 85.
30. Id. at 88 ("[O]utrage against the illegal alien appears to offer a legitimate-that is,
nonracist-way of redefining the scope and limits of an increasingly complex society.").
31. Id. at 103.
32. Id. at 130-32.
33. Id. at 130.
34. Id. at 131. "Liberal individualism" is weak on creating structural equality because it views
interventions of this type "as illiberal impositions on the individual rights and freedoms of others."
Id. at 107. Liberal cultural pluralism mutes the discussion of racial inequality because it seeks "to
deemphasize the continuing significance of race." Id. at 109-10. Rather than focus on the
structural causes of inequality, "liberal pluralist theory has tended to place most of the responsibility
for overcoming social barriers to integration in the hands of immigrants themselves." Id. at 112.
With a hands-off approach, these liberal tendencies reinforce "a field of racial-ethnic dividing lines"
that cultural preservationists insist "must not be transgressed." Id. at 113. Marxists like Slavoj
Zizek offer "a new kind of egalitarian unity that liquidates all differences" between persons, forcing
the marginalized immigrant (and all others) "to conform to an already established set of ideals." Id.
at 127.
35. See id. at 150 ("[Ilmmigrant marginality is just one manifestation of a type of legal-political
marginality that is shared by a growing number of legal residents and native-born persons. Simply
put, the same policy developments that have weakened immigrant rights have also weakened the
social, civil, and legal rights of all U.S. residents.").
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the United States." 36 To harness the potential "to transform the perspectives
of all parties ... involved in the encounter," the dialogue must engage people
"across lines of difference."3 To advance this debate, he wants the public to
"be exposed to arguments that demonstrate that conservative populists are
not the only ones who are frustrated with the current immigration
situation."38 In the end, he advocates a paradigm shift that will encourage the
public "to become actively involved in a discussion about 'who we are' as a
national people."09
II. Critique One: Extinguishing the Possibility of Dialogue
Just as the Jim Crow laws were designed to exclude those of
African descent from American society, the laws excluding Asian
immigrants upheld in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting betray a
belief in racial separation.40
Race has played a large and infamous role in United States immigration
law and policy, gaining the imprimatur of the Supreme Court a generation
after the end of the Civil War. In The Chinese Exclusion Case,4 the Court
upheld the exclusion of Chae Chan Ping, a twelve-year resident of the United
States, stating:
If . .. the government of the United States, through its legislative
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in
this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its
peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the
time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the
foreigners are subjects.42
Although immigration laws are now facially race neutral, there are
undoubtedly lingering present effects of these past practices. 43 And it would
36. Id. at 147-48.
37. Id. at 148.
38. Id. at 147. Some of these conservative populists engage in "incendiary rhetoric" emanating
from an "outrage" that "rests on a foundation of white privilege," which justifies "incitement to
violence ... as an expression of patriotism." Id. at 145-46.
39. Id. at 147.
40. Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional
Law oflImmigration, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1, 2 (1998).
41. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
42. Id. at 606. California had asked Congress to take action barring Chinese immigration:
In December, 1878, the convention which framed the present constitution of
California, being in session, took this subject up, and memorialized Congress upon it,
setting forth, in substance, that the presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful effect
upon the material interests of the State, and upon public morals; that their immigration
was in numbers approaching the character of an Oriental invasion, and was a menace
to our civilization; that the discontent from this cause was not confined to any political
party, or to any class or nationality, but was well-nigh universal ....
Id. at 595.
43. See Chin, supra note 40, at 38-50 (noting that, as a result of past immigration laws, Asian
Americans are underrepresented in the political process, have fewer connections through which to
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deny human experience to suggest that covert or subconscious racial
classifications have been eliminated from the minds and hearts of all
denizens of the United States." But does this mean that all immigration
restrictionists and all persons who favor stopping the flow of illegal
migration are motivated by racial prejudice? Might they have some
legitimate nonracial concerns?
Kretsedemas dreams of an America where structural and institutional
barriers to immigrant inclusion are eliminated. To get there from here, he
desires a robust and transformative dialogue involving individuals across the
ideological and racial spectra.45  Given our history, he sees "critical race"
analysis as necessary to this dialogue.46 Despite recognizing the difficulty of
this task, Kretsedemas's method of using race to frame his argument
ultimately disserves his stated objective, undermining rather than advancing
the dialogue on immigrant marginality.
In any transformative dialogue, rigorous truth telling and truth
recognition is vital. But dialogue is difficult if not impossible when one of
the dialogue partners-especially the one calling for the dialogue-assumes
the worst of another partner with little or no evidence. Yet this is the path
chosen by Kretsedemas. He, for example, argues that "[t]here is evidence
that the contemporary anti-immigrant movement is still steeped in the racial
ideologies of the Jim Crow era and that this has carried over into the
movement to expand local enforcement laws."4 8 His evidence? The KKK
"tried to use local complaints about illegal immigration as a recruitment
tool." 4 9 This would be like saying that the current labor movement is steeped
in Marxist ideology because the Communist Party is using the "assault" on
public unions as a recruiting tool. He further suggests that "outrage against
the illegal alien appears to offer a legitimate-that is, nonracist-way of
redefining the scope and limits of an increasingly complex society."50 This
conservative "populist outrage rests on a foundation of white privilege,
which makes it possible for the incitement to violence to be viewed as an
assimilate into new occupations and geographic regions, and still face the "stigma of
discrimination").
44. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (describing the effects of subconscious
racism on the legislative process, particularly as it relates to the distinction between discriminatory
purpose and disproportionate impact standards of discrimination).
45. KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at 148.
46. Id. at 150.
47. See DANIEL PHILPOTr, JUST AND UNJUST PEACE: AN ETHIC OF POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION 183 (2012) ("Acknowledgment of past injustice ... aims to achieve intrinsically
valuable primary restorations, redressing wounds that are wider and deeper than is often
recognized.").
48. KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at 87.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 88.
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expression of patriotism-and not as a threat to the public safety."
Ironically, he creates a stereotyped "Other" who is to be stigmatized and
marginalized.52 As a scholar with an admittedly pro-immigrant bent," I
would find it impossible to have a transformative dialogue with those I have
stereotyped and associated with the KKK, Jim Crow,54 white privilege, and
violence unless they were superhumanly able to turn a blind eye and forgive
me my prejudices.
III. Critique Two: Some Institution Must Govern
According to Kretsedemas, "structural-institutional conditions ...
produce immigrant marginality."55  Eliminating these conditions will require
dialogue among an inclusive populace "about 'who we are' as a national
people" so that our "popular concept of the nation can be interrogated and
transformed."56  To be effective though, the fruits of this dialogue will need
to be implemented by some governing authority. And, it is here, at the stage
51. Id. at 146. In stark contrast to Kretsedemas's approach, Kevin Johnson provides a
challenging but nonaccusatory call to dialogue on the racial implications of immigration law and
policy. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law
in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525, 534
("[O]ne cannot categorically state that the U.S. immigration laws are 'racist.' Nonetheless, a greater
percentage of immigrants would be people of color without the many screening devices that
disparately impact potential immigrants from developing nations.").
52. See KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at 145-46 ("[S]ome conservative populists [assert] the
moral authority to take the life of the Other.").
53. See, e.g., Michael A. Scaperlanda, More on the Ethics of Immigration, FIRST THINGS,
June/July 2008, at 16, 18, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/07/002-more-on-the-
ethics-of-immigration-43 (arguing, as part of a dialogue with William W. Chip, that religious
principles, particularly the idea of welcoming foreigners who are seeking a more prosperous life,
should be considered as part of the modern immigration debate); Michael A. Scaperlanda, The
Ethics of Immigration: An Exchange, FIRST THINGS, May 2008, at 40, 46, available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/04/005-the-ethics-of-immigration-an-exchange-5 (same);
Michael A. Scaperlanda, Reflections on Immigration Reform, the Workplace and the Family, 4 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 508, 510 (2007) (proposing a resolution wherein the United States adopts a guest
worker program, legalizes most of the undocumented immigrants currently in the country, and
provides aid to foreign countries to reduce the economic disparities drawing people towards the
United States); Michael Scaperlanda, Who Is My Neighbor?: An Essay on Immigrants, Welfare
Reform, and the Constitution, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1587, 1589 (1997) (critiquing the immigrant
stripping provisions of the Welfare Reform Act as antithetical to American ideals); Michael
Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REv. 707,
707 (1996) ("[A] strong anti-immigrant undertow threatens to pull us from our constitutional
commitment to equality and from our national mythology of open arms and golden doors.");
Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 965, 966 (arguing
that the constitutional protections nominally granted to aliens have largely proven illusory).
54. Throughout the book, Kretsedemas draws parallels between the sentiment that motivated
Jim Crow and the sentiment that motivates today's immigration restrictionist arguments. Jim Crow
is mentioned on 24 of the book's 151 pages (more than 15%). See KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at
209 (listing pages where the term Jim Crow appears).
55. Id. at 134; see also id. at 101 ("[S]tructural inequalities and forms of institutional
discrimination . .. may [a]ffect the life chances of [immigrant] children.").
56. Id. at 147.
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of governing, that an unstated ambivalence appears in the argument, leaving
an unresolved tension as to who ought to govern with respect to immigration
law and policy.
Kretsedemas devotes two of his six chapters to executive and local
governance of immigration law. In Chapter Three ("The Secret Life of the
State"), he decries the expansion of Executive discretion in the American
political landscape. In Chapter Four ("Concerned Citizens, Local
Exclusions: Local Immigration Laws and the Legacy of Jim Crow"), he
criticizes the devolution of authority over immigration to state and local
governments. Does he want more congressional or judicial involvement?57
He doesn't say! Do Executive discretion and local immigration lawmaking
contribute to the structural and institutional defects that "produce" immigrant
marginality? If so, what is the solution? He doesn't offer one!
By criticizing the "who" without offering a viable alternative,
Kretsedemas misses out on the "what." Our history makes clear that both
good and bad policy can be made at all levels of government and in all
branches of government. And it makes equally clear that both fair and
arbitrary implementation of that policy can be made at all levels of
government. No one level or branch of government has a monopoly on the
virtues or the vices. Therefore, exposing the vices of two groups of policy
makers/implementers without an argument as to why those groups are
particularly ill suited to address the immigration issues confronting them is
singularly unhelpful in advancing the dialogue.
In the end, Kretsedemas seems to favor a strong centralized governing
authority that would bind itself and others to "predefined rules and
regulations" that diminish the ability to exercise discretion in the face of
"unfolding contingencies."58  He decries "deregulation and federal
devolution" because they "create spaces of decision-making authority-
which free the individual from binding legalities-that can be granted to a
variety of private and public actors."59  But he does not tell us who this
centralized authority is, why he has confidence that it will-at least in his
opinion-get the rules and regulations right, or how various actors are to
respond to unforeseen contingencies in the absence of discretion.o
57. If he were to add chapters on congressional and judicial decision making, he would need to
include their racially laced actions, including passage of and judicial acquiescence in the Chinese
Exclusion laws. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
58. KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at 61. But see Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492,
2499 (2012) ("Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human
concerns.").
59. Id. With devolution and deregulation, "[plrivate corporations are given more freedom to
relocate their manufacturing centers and recruit (and terminate) workers as needed." Id.
Philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel articulately sums up what I take to be Kretsedemas's ideal
governing authority: "[I]t aims at being the organizer-in-chief of society, and at making its
monopoly of this role ever more complete." BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, ON POWER 236 (1949).
60. Kretsedemas views broad discretion as "a forbidden continuity that connects the power
practices of modem governments to those of the feudal monarchy." KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2,
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IV. Critique Three: In Search of an Ethical Foundation
To address the problem of "immigrant marginality," Kretsedemas wants
to move beyond an "emphasis on the utility of the immigrant worker" and
put the pro-immigration case on "a stronger ethical foundation." 61 But, he
fails to offer one! A stronger ethical foundation requires an answer to this
critical question: Why should we as individuals or as a nation care about the
immigrant, marginal or not?62  He does not ask, much less answer, the
question.
Although liberalism's framework has its own set of problems,63 its
framework is not available to Kretsedemas on his stated terms because he
wants "to look beyond the neoliberal common sense that has dominated
federal policy for the past several decades."" In addition to liberalism, he
discusses the approach of two other rival intellectual traditions-
conservatism and Marxism-to the problem of immigrant marginality,
finding all three traditions deficient. 5 But he never proposes an alternative.
Although his critical race analysis shines a particular light on immigrant
marginality, it does not provide a framework for answering the foundational
question of why we should care about the immigrant.
Kretsedemas suggests that American "ideals could be revitalized by an
agnostic engagement with [a] wider world of ideas"66 as it searches for a
at 53. De Jouvenel offers a different perspective: "The assents of people or assembly, so far from
fettering for the rulers a freedom to act which they never had, made possible an extension of
governmental authority." DE JOUVENEL, supra note 59, at 208-09 ("The power to legislate is not
an attribute which was taken from Power by the establishment of an assembly or by popular
consultation. It is an addition to Power, of so novel a kind that without an assembly or without
popular consultation it would have been impossible.").
61. KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at 4.
62. Kretsedemas does ask important foundational questions: "[E]ven if we all agree that we are
in favor of a more just and democratic society, who gets to define what those terms mean? ... And
at what point does this willingness to be perpetually open to new voices ... run the risk of
collapsing into an incoherent relativism?" Id at 148. Great questions-especially given his desire
for a stronger ethical foundation-but he punts, saying that "thorough exploration of these questions
is beyond the scope of this book." Id. Without this exploration, Kretsedemas leaves us without
criteria for assessing the answers.
63. See Michael A. Scaperlanda, Immigration Justice: Beyond Liberal Egalitarian and
Communitarian Perspectives, 57 REv. SOC. ECON. 523, 527 (1999) (noting that liberal theory is ill
equipped to justify immigration restrictions).
64. KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at 4.
65. Id. at 130. Kretsedemas does not explore whether religious traditions-Jewish, Christian,
or Muslim, for instance-have resources that might aid in solving the problem of immigrant
marginality. Cf Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1265 n.l (10th Cir. 2004) (Henry, J.,
dissenting) ("If an alien will reside with you in your land, you shall not persecute him. The alien
who resides with you shall be to you like a citizen of yours, and you shall love him as yourself,
because you were aliens in the land of Egypt. I am the YWWH, your God." (quoting Leviticus
19:33-34)).
66. Id. at 129-30. American identity "is better described as an open-ended project (propelled
by an agnostic dialogue between social equals)." Id. at 135. His "agnostic engagement" like Bruce
Ackerman's "neutral dialogue" plants him firmly within liberalism's orbit. See generally BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1981).
1180
Stirring the Melting Pot
"forward-looking vision" for immigration policy.6 1 Unfortunately, lacking a
foundation, an "agnostic engagement" cannot produce a "forward-looking
vision." When I get into my car, I would be negligent to approach the gears
with agnostic engagement. Foundations-including ethical foundations-
require a clear sense of where one stands, what is behind, and what is in
front. In short, ethical foundations require a criterion for judgment.
Standing on a firm ethical foundation with a clear vision forward does
not necessarily entail arrogance or close mindedness. With proper humility,
anyone standing on what she thinks is the strongest ethical foundations will
be open to taking direction and even correction from those with whom she is
engaged. Instead of an agnostic engagement, I suggest a thickly pluralistic
engagement, where each participant in the dialogue brings herself, including
her intellectual tradition with its ethical core, to the conversation. In this
difficult dialogue, there will be, as Kretsedemas understands, multiple and
contested visions of forward.
In our pluralistic society, the difficulty lies in the fact that we have rival
intellectual traditions with different ethical foundations and "there is no
neutral way of characterizing . .. the standards by which their claims are to
be evaluated."6 8  Alasdair MacIntyre suggests a difficult two-stage process
for engagement under these conditions. First, each participant "characterizes
the contentions of its rival in its own terms."69 Second, after recognizing the
inability of one's own tradition to solve intractable problems, the participant
looks to another tradition to see if it has the resources to solve these problems
in a more satisfactory fashion. In short, I advocate an openness without
agnosticism.
V. Response: Immigration and the Human Experience
Kretsedemas argues that "neoliberal priorities guiding U.S. immigration
policy have been actively creating the structural-institutional conditions that
produce immigrant marginality."7 1  Structural-institutional conditions can
exacerbate or mitigate immigrant marginality, but they do not produce it.
67. Id. at 136. Despite his calls for agnosticism, it is clear that Kretsedemas is not an
immigration-policy agnostic, having rejected the ideas of "cultural conservatives" like Huntington.
KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at 129.
68. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 166 (1988).
69. Id. In doing this, each tradition must "mak[e] explicit the grounds for rejecting what is
incompatible with its own central theses" while recognizing what it might learn from its rival "on
marginal and subordinate questions." Id
70. Id. at 166-67. As MacIntyre notes:
In controversy between rival traditions the difficulty in passing from the first stage
to the second is that it requires a rare gift of empathy as well as of intellectual insight
for the protagonists of such a tradition to be able to understand the theses, arguments,
and concepts of their rival in such a way that they are able to view themselves from
such an alien standpoint ....
Id. at 167.
71. KRETSEDEMAS, supra note 2, at 134 (emphasis added).
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Immigrant marginality is a reality, inherent to the human condition.
Believing that institutional or structural changes can eliminate it is simply
fanciful utopian thinking.
Even if the term "alien" is in some sense pejorative in labeling an
72immigrant, in a very real sense "alien" is an appropriate term for describing
the relationship between the immigrant and his new country. Language,
culture, history, and tradition often create a wide gulf between the migrant
and the native. They do not yet belong to each other. Each may view the
other with suspicion. The migrant may wonder whether he can trust the
police and other local authorities, whether he will be discriminated against in
the workplace, and ultimately whether he will be accepted. The native may
wonder whether the migrant can be trusted to obey the laws, whether he will
deplete precious community resources-including jobs-and whether he will
disrupt and perhaps destroy the embedded language, culture, and traditions.
To borrow a popular phrase from Kretsedemas, each looks at the other as
"Other."
The difference between the migrant and the native is that the migrant is
alone, or at least more alone, having left her community-her language,
culture, history, and tradition-to begin life anew in another community.
Almost by definition, the alien will reside on the margins of that new
community. No change in institutional structure or condition can change this
fact. In his autobiographical account, Next Year in Cuba: A Cubano's
Coming-of-Age in America, Gustavo P&rez Firmat describes refugees as:
amputees. . .. Just as people who lose limbs sometimes continue to
ache or tingle in the missing calf or hand, the exile suffers the absence
of the self he left behind. I feel the loss of that Cuban boy inside me.
He's my phantom limb, at times dogging me like a guilty thought, at
other times accompanying me like a guardian angel.74
Although Firmat draws a distinction between a person in "exile" and an
"immigrant,"75 his metaphor applies to economic immigrants as well,
especially those who leave their country of origin because of an inability to
support themselves or their families.
72. See STEPHEN LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 1-2 (5th ed. 2009) ("[T]he word 'alien,' even when not adorned with the modifier 'illegal,'
has always struck a disturbing chord. Many feel that the term connotes dehumanizing qualities of
strangeness or inferiority (space aliens come readily to mind) and that its use builds walls, strips
human beings of their essential dignity, and needlessly reinforces an 'outsider' status.").
73. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "alien" as "[bjelonging to another person, place, or
family; not of one's own; from elsewhere, foreign." See Alien, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/4988?isAdvanced=false&result-1&rskey-7xc6tn& (last updated
Sept. 2012).
74. GUSTAVO PtREz FIRMAT, NEXT YEAR IN CUBA: A CUBANO'S COMING-OF-AGE IN
AMERICA 22 (1995).
75. Id. at 121-22.
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The migrant suffers great loss and often bears the burden alone. But it
would be a mistake to ignore the loss-real, perceived, or potential-
suffered by the native population. In advocating open borders, Joseph
Carens acknowledges that "immigration ... might destroy old ways of life,
highly valued by some, but it would make possible new ways of life, highly
valued by others."7 As Wendell Berry's character, Jayber Crow, recognizes,
change can make "distant what had been close, and close what had been
distant." 7 Speaking of himself, Crow said:
If you have lived in Port William a little more than two years, you
are still, by Port William standards, a stranger, liable, to have your
name mispronounced .... [T]hough I was only twenty-two when I
came to the town, many ... would call me "Mr. Cray" to acknowledge
that they did not know me well.... Once my customers took me to
themselves, they called me Jaybird, and then Jayber. Thus I became,
and have remained, a possession of Port William.78
Integration of migrants takes time. Although governmental institutions
and structures do not cause migrant marginality and cannot eliminate it, they
might serve to mitigate it. Congress could enact legislation that more
effectively closes the backdoor of illegal migration by giving the Executive
the discretionary authority to match the number of nonimmigrant laborers to
the rise and fall in the demand for labor coupled with effective sanctions for
employing unauthorized workers. Giving nonimmigrants job portability
might reduce the incidences of employer exploitation. Any enforcement
officer-whether federal or state-ought to be held accountable if they fail to
treat noncitizens with dignity and respect. And states ought to remove
barriers that raise the cost for individuals and communities to care for the
immigrant as she adjusts to her new life in a new country.79
The government will assign the nonimmigrant an identifying number
but will not learn the nonimmigrant's name, much less how to pronounce the
name. The government will not take a personal interest in the
nonimmigrant's family, culture, or history. Immigrant marginality recedes
and immigrant integration begins at the backyard barbecue, the pub, and the
church as families celebrate births, graduations, marriages, deaths, and
holidays together. The migrant will not be at home in her adopted country
until she is known and loved in her new community. And that takes time.
76. Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REv. POL. 251, 271
(1987). Although Carens is addressing open immigration, his thesis holds with more limited
migration.
77. See BERRY, supra note 1, at 281.
78. Id. at 11. Crow, the stranger, was born in the town of Goforth a couple of miles from Port
William. Id. at 11-12.
79. See, e.g., Michael Scaperlanda, Religious Freedom in the Face of Harsh State and Local
Immigration Laws, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 165, 166 (2008) (discussing an Oklahoma law,
"which the Dallas Morning News referred to as 'the nation's toughest law on illegal immigrants,
making it a felony to harbor, transport, shelter or conceal undocumented immigrants"').
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Making Sense of the Marriage Debate
FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE. By Michael J. Klarman. New
York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 276 pages. $27.95.
Reviewed by Jane S. Schacter*
When are courts justified in trumping a majority's will? Can
countermajoritarian decisions produce meaningful social change? Which
minority groups command special judicial protection from the depredations
of the majority? These are classic questions of constitutional law and theory
and have shaped the scholarly literature for two generations. The ongoing
movement for marriage equality features all of these questions and has, since
its inception in the early 1990s, spawned a national debate about the role of
courts.
Michael Klarman's From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and
the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage' comprehensively traces the marriage
debate with a special eye on the role of courts in propelling it. Among its
many gifts is that of exquisite timing. The book was published only a few
months before the Supreme Court announced in late 2012 that it would hear
constitutional challenges to the federal Defense of Marriage Act and to
California's Proposition 8.2 If the marriage debate were a symphony whose
first movement began with an unexpected Hawaii decision in 1993, one
might say that the Supreme Court's twin grants of certiorari in these cases
foreshadowed a crescendo of sorts. Or maybe not. In fact, as the book
reflects, the Supreme Court will enter this debate after some twenty years of
groundbreaking litigation around the country,4 noisy debates in state and
federal legislative chambers,s and scores of hotly contested ballot measures.
What the Supreme Court decides to do will be significant and highly
watched. But one of the points the book communicates so effectively is that
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
1. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013).
2. United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012);
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133
S. Ct. 786 (2012); Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Two Challenges on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/us/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-two-cases-on-
gay-marriage.html?ref-adamliptak& r-0.
3. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 48-60.
4. KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 48-89, 90-91.
5. Id. at 108-09, 143-55.
6. Id. at 65-66, 84, 112, 120-26, 144-46, 193.
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the trajectory of public opinion strongly favors marriage equality, with young
people vastly more supportive than older citizens.' The proverbial writing
seems to be on the wall. Thus, the Court's first foray into this national
debate may well tell us more about how the justices want their role in it to be
remembered than it does about how the issue will be substantively settled in
American society.
Klarman's book will, in any event, equip its readers to reflect
thoughtfully about whatever the Court decides to do. The book sets the stage
for the Court's action by offering a readable history, in chapter and verse, of
the developments that have shaped the marriage equality movement.
Klarman closely follows the legal trajectory from the 1993 Hawaii decision
that made same-sex marriage appear imminent, 8 through the 2003
Massachusetts decision that actually legalized same-sex marriage for the first
time in the United States,9 through many other state court decisions, as well
as the more recent federal cases. But this history goes far beyond any narrow
charting of judicial decisions or doctrinal developments. Klarman also
closely explores the fierce backlash around the country in the form of dozens
of anti-same-sex-marriage measures on the state and federal level,'0 as well
as the political context that shaped this backlash." Throughout, he deftly
explores the key dynamics in the social, political, and cultural environment
that have both fueled and thwarted the claim in favor of same-sex marriage.
For those who have pressed for marriage equality, this history has been full
of soaring victories and bruising defeats, along with plenty of political
mobilization and countermobilization. But through it all, there has been a
steady growth of public supportl2 for what was once seen as the marginal and
socially implausible idea of state-recognized same-sex marriage.
The book sets out not only to tell, but to understand, this deeply mixed
history and to consider what lessons we might draw from it. In this review, I
first assess Klarman's rendering of the story and the conclusions he reaches.
I then consider what the story he tells might suggest about some enduring
questions in American constitutional law and scholarship.
About two-thirds of the book tells the story of the movement for
marriage equality. The remaining third reflects on the causes and
implications of the backlash against the equalizing efforts of courts. The
7. Id. at 199-200, 218.
8. Id. at 57-60.
9. Id. at 90-93.
10. Id. at 26-29, 68, 80-83, 95-98, 144-46, 175-76.
11. Id. at 31-36, 60-63.
12. Id. at 105-06, 135-37, 161, 166-69, 178-98; see also Frank Newport, Religion Big Factor
for Americans Against Same-Sex Marriage, GALLUP (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/159089/religion-major-factor-americans-opposed-sex-marriage.aspx
(discussing the results of a Gallup poll conducted in November 2012 showing that a majority of
young Americans support same-sex marriage).
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careful historical chapters are fascinating in their own right, and also set the
stage for the later reflections on the role played by litigation.
The principal historical narrative stretches from the 1950s and 1960s to
mid-2011, when the New York legislature enacted marriage-equality
legislation. 13 The radically disparate periods that bookend the historical
portion of the book speak volumes about one of Klarman's principal themes:
the enormous and ongoing social change in the LGBT-rights1 4 arena. In the
time period addressed in Chapter 1, every state criminalized consensual
sexual activity between partners of the same gender, the medical profession
saw homosexuality as a disease, and even the ACLU saw no problems
criminalizing behavior that it called "socially heretical or deviant."" Early
attempts to protest or organize against a pervasively repressive status quo
were fraught with danger.16 The contrast with 2011 could hardly be starker.
When New York enacted its marriage legislation with the enthusiastic
support of Governor Andrew Cuomo, not only did it join five other states and
the District of Columbia in offering full marriage equality, but an additional
twelve states offered civil union or domestic partnership protection, twenty-
one states had added sexual orientation to their antidiscrimination statutes,
the Supreme Court had ruled bans on consensual sodomy unconstitutional,
and it had become common for LGBT persons to come out and to be widely
featured in popular culture, to name just a few developments of note. 7
Klarman's first eight chapters touch on many of the key
developments-large and small-that put such a great distance between the
1950s and 2011. None are bigger for his story of the marriage-equality
movement than the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision in Baehr v.
Lewin.18 Baehr was a case that LGBT-rights litigators had declined to bring,
fearing that it was premature. 9 It was brought by a private attorney.20 Much
to the surprise of virtually all observers, the decision held that the Hawaii
Constitution mandated the application of strict scrutiny to the state's
traditional marriage laws-making it highly likely that the state law
restricting marriage to a man and a woman would be found
unconstitutional. 21 The specter of same-sex couples getting married in
13. Id. at 163-64.
14. I will use the inclusive term "LGBT" (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender), though the
issues relating to bisexuality and transgender do not figure much in the book.
15. Id. at 3-6.
16. Id. at 7.
17. Id. at 163-64; see also Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2012,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/same-sexmarriage/index.html
(providing an overview of recent legal, political, and public opinion changes with regard to same-
sex marriage).
18. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
19. KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 55.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 56.
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Hawaii and seeking recognition in other states was the big bang, as it were,
of a debate that has been roiling ever since. As Klarman and others have
noted, soon after Baehr, LGBT-rights litigators felt they had little choice but
to hop on a train that they themselves had not thought ready to leave the
22station.
While history will record 1993 as the key start date, Klarman's narrative
reflects that it was, in fact, only a few years after the Stonewall uprising
kicked off the modem gay-rights movement in 1969 that the first marriage-
equality lawsuits were launched.23 They were not taken terribly seriously,
though it was, interestingly, one of these early suits-pressed by two gay
students at the University of Minnesota who had unsuccessfully sought a
marriage license-that led to the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in
Baker v. Nelson.24 That ruling has regularly shown up in briefs opposing
marriage equality.25 It seems unlikely the justices deciding the pending
Windsor26 and Perry27 cases will be too concerned with a forty-year-old
summary affirmance issued before any of the contemporary gay-rights cases
in constitutional law, but it will surely be enlisted for support by those
defending DOMA and Prop 8.
Much of the story Klarman tells will be familiar to students of the
LGBT-rights movement. Indeed, because a lot of it is very recent and has
been the subject of extensive media coverage, some will be familiar even to
those who have not immersed themselves in the history of LGBT rights.
Still, the history is quite well told and is synthesized in ways likely to engage
a general audience. One might wish that Klarman had devoted more
22. Id. at 55; see also Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage
Equality, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1235, 1245 (2010) (explaining that LGBT lawyers "did not
affirmatively pursue litigation to achieve the right to marry in Hawaii," but instead joined the Baehr
effort after the fact to help shape legal strategy); Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of
Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 1153, 1165-66 (2009)
[hereinafter Schacter, Politics ofBacklash] (discussing how the major gay-rights litigators refused
to take on the Baehr action, believing it to be premature).
23. See Schacter, Politics of Backlash, supra note 22, at 1165 (explaining that neither
Goodridge nor Baehr was the first lawsuit to challenge different-sex-only marriage and pointing to
early test cases in Kentucky, Minnesota, and Washington that the government won). See generally
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (affirming the lower court's refusal to issue a
marriage license to a same-sex couple); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (holding
that Minnesota law limited marriage to different-sex couples, which did not violate the United
States Constitution), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1974) (holding that the statutory prohibition on same-sex marriage did not violate state or
federal constitutional rights).
24. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
25. E.g., Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants' Opening Brief 32 n.7, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-16577), 2011 WL 6117216, at *32 n.7, cert. granted sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). For a recent decision accepting defense arguments
that Baker should be accorded precedential effect, see Jackson v. Abercrombie, No. 11-00734, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111376, at *45-51 (D. Haw. Aug. 8, 2012).
26. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
27. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 786.
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attention to certain stories that profoundly capture the kinds of personal
struggles that happen when the way people live is not matched by an
available legal infrastructure. For example, Klarman only briefly touches on
the stories of two women-both, coincidentally, named Sharon-who
became iconic within the LGBT community as their legal battles unfolded in
the 1980s and '90s.28 Sharon Kowalski was in a disabling auto accident in
1983, and her longtime partner was shut out of her life for years by Sharon's
family of origin.2 9 Ultimately, a court allowed Sharon to choose her own
guardian and she chose her partner.30 In 1993, in Virginia, Sharon Bottoms
lost custody of her son Tyler to her own mother after Sharon came out as a
lesbian and her mother alleged she was an unfit parent.31 In this instance, the
courts did not rule in her favor.32 Much more could have been said about
both, though, in fairness to Klarman, he does not purport to offer a detailed
exposition of all important LGBT legal battles.
Klarman also weaves into his narrative some information that is less
widely known. Three examples of such stories are illustrative, and each ties
to a larger theme that characterizes the movement for marriage equality. One
example is when Klarman tells of an early attempt by an unnamed male
couple to secure a same-sex marriage license in Colorado in 1975.3' After
receiving advice from a local district attorney that the state marriage law did
not clearly outlaw same-sex marriage, a county clerk granted licenses to this
couple and a few others.34 About a month later, the state Attorney General
shut down the clerk by issuing an opinion that same-sex marriage was
prohibited.3 5 While this episode of on-the-ground activism garnered some
publicity and seems to have exposed the couples to some hostile reactions, its
relatively modest public profile contrasts starkly with the climate over the
last two decades. In that more recent climate-one in which the internet has
turbocharged the flow of information-all things same-sex marriage have
been a magnet for media attention and have quickly become part of a
polarized national political debate.
A second example sheds some light on precisely the absence of a
polarized national political debate in the 1970s. Klarman explores the role of
28. KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 50-51.
29. Id at 50.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 51.
32. Id. at 50-51.
33. Id. at 20-21.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Id.
36. Indeed, Richard Adams, one of the men seeking to get a marriage license in Colorado
recently died, and the New York Times published an obituary. Margalit Fox, Richard Adams,
Same-Sex Spouse Who Sued U.S., Dies at 65, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2012,
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/25/us/richard-adams-who-sued-us-after-1975-gay-marriage-dies-
at-65.html?_r-0. One wonders if his death would have drawn the same public notice in the absence
of the high-profile contemporary marriage debate.
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LGBT issues in helping to propel the rise of the religious right in the late
1970s and early 1980s. He notes that the first-ever advertisement on gay
issues to run in a presidential campaign was offered up by a group called
"Christians for Reagan" in the 1980 election.3 1 Whereas President Carter had
carried evangelical voters in 1976, Klarman notes, Reagan won them by a
two-to-one margin in 1980.38 Reagan's election has proven to be something
of a prototype for what has now become utterly routine and familiar: the
close intersection of LGBT and other social issues with electoral politics, and
a steady and predictable partisan alignment. That linkage has played a big
role in the marriage debate. By 1993, when Baehr was decided, the forces
who would oppose same-sex marriage had long since mobilized against
LGBT rights and made themselves a vocal part of national politics. That
political organization helped to shape-and quickly nationalize-the
backlash by positioning cultural conservatives to respond quickly to
developments like the surprise ruling in Hawaii.39
A third example relates to another main theme in the book: the veritable
chasm of an age divide in the general public on the same-sex marriage
issue.40 Klarman emphasizes the pronounced difference in support for same-
sex marriage, as between older and younger segments of the electorate.4 1 At
one point, though, he probes an interesting variant of this phenomenon with
poll data reflecting a pronounced age effect even within the LGBT
community. In 2003, 18-year-old gay respondents were 31% more likely to
support same-sex marriage than 65-year-old gay respondents.42 Generational
differences in this context suggest a change in both expectations and
priorities in the LGBT community.
All in all, Klarman's telling of the story is well done in the way it
weaves together the interacting legal, political, social, and cultural forces,
and connects small details to larger developments. He makes clear,
moreover, that while the same-sex marriage movement began with a Hawaii
lawsuit, its dynamics have ranged far beyond the judicial domain and have
proven quite complex.
Having said that, though, there are places where assertions are made
that seem puzzling or unpersuasive. For example, in the course of
introducing the debate over same-sex marriage, Klarman observes that the
"[a]rguments for and against gay marriage have not changed much over the
past two decades."A3 While he may be correct that some core concepts have
37. KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 55-57 (chronicling the circumstances leading up to and the backlash against the
Hawaii ruling).
40. Id at 199-200.
41. Id.
42. Id at 51.
43. Id at 52.
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persisted through these years-say, the much debated link between
procreation and marriage-in fact, opponents of marriage equality have
markedly refined and moderated their arguments over the years. For
example, whereas the congressional debates about DOMA in 1995 featured
plenty of references to "perversion" and "lust," the campaign for Prop 8 in
2008 stayed studiously away from such incendiary rhetoric and focused,
instead, on claims about what children would have to be taught in schools.4
The perceived strategic advantage in toning down arguments is a point worth
pausing to note because it captures the dynamic nature of the debate, and
corresponds to the rise in pro-gay public opinion that Klarman makes a
central point of his analysis.
A more significant issue in the book, though, is with some problematic
claims of cause and effect. At one point, for example, Klarman suggests that
some wondered if the rash of pro-marriage-equality developments in what he
calls the "gay marriage spring" of 2009 would affect the California Supreme
Court justices deliberating on a state constitutional challenge to Prop 8.
Having raised that possibility, he then concludes that the developments did
not, in fact, influence them.4 6 He reaches that conclusion, presumably,
because the state supreme court went on to uphold Prop 8. But it is only a
very narrow concept of "influence" that would reason to that conclusion from
the outcome of the case. It could well be that the justices were influenced,
but in the other direction. That is, it is plausible that they were influenced to
turn down the challenge because they could see the trajectory of public
opinion and were less inclined to believe that judicial intervention would be
necessary to overturn Prop 8. In any event, the question of how outside
developments actually "influence" judges is a difficult one to study. Even
assuming that judges themselves could correctly identify what influences
their decisions, they are not likely to recite or reveal it.
Consider another example: Klarman's treatment of the marriages
performed in 2004 in San Francisco, as directed by then-Mayor Gavin
Newsom. 4 8 Newsom acted without legal authority, and the marriages he
pennitted were later declared invalid. 49 There is no question that, as ably
described by Klarman, the Newsom weddings were quite controversial, and
44. On the changes since the DOMA debate, see Ariane De Vogue, Congress Evolves on
DOMA, Same-Sex Marriage, ABC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/congress-
evolves-doma-sex-marriage/storyid=17888075#.UNYwnHdU3. On the character of the arguments
stressed in the Prop 8 campaign, see Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights:
Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357, 366-67 (2009) (characterizing
Prop 8 proponents' campaign as presenting their position less as "homophobia and discrimination"
and more as "reasonable dissent").
45. KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 119, 134.
46. Id. at 134.
47. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009).
48. KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 189-90.
49. See id. at 99 ("Newsom's action was largely symbolic, as experts were certain that the state
would not recognize such licenses.").
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many thought they were counterproductive. But it is puzzling for Klarman to
assert, without any obvious way to prove it, that the rogue weddings in San
Francisco (as well as similar weddings in Oregon) "more than the Goodridge
decision that inspired them, ignited the powerful political backlash of
2004."so That statement begs any number of questions-how could one
know which action caused more backlash, or make fine calibrations, given
that they took place within months of each other? How could or would one
test this proposition? The facts, cited by Klarman, that legislators like
Barney Frank and Dianne Feinstein lamented what Newsom did, that
opponents of marriage equality thought it helped them, and that Karl Rove
seemed to feel that President Bush derived political benefit from it,5I do not
supply that proof.
At one point, Klarman speculates that these weddings backfired because
observers had a "visceral[ly]" negative reaction to seeing the celebrating
couples.52 That is plausible and, for some who watched the coverage, likely
to be true. But the suggestion is in some tension with the point stressed
elsewhere that a key dynamic in boosting public support for gay rights has
been the increased visibility of gay people. Klarman explicitly discusses the
proliferation of gay television characters in the 1990s, as well as the effect of
more gay people coming out to friends, family, and others. It is, then,
unclear how particular images of weddings would be in a totally different
category. To the extent the backlash he associates with the west-coast
weddings involves couples kissing, in particular, perhaps there is a
distinguishing characteristic there.54 But, of course, not all couples on line to
get married kissed one another, not all who saw those images would have
reacted the same way, and-in general-the proof remains elusive.
None of these individual points is overwhelmingly important, and the
point is not to nitpick. The point is, instead, to notice that it is difficult to
make confident assessments of causation when there are so many complex
dynamics in play, and so many different individuals and subcommunities
taking it all in. The scholarly impulse to reach causal conclusions is
understandable, but the facts are often too messy to warrant sure
conclusions.
Indeed, one of the most salutary aspects of the book is that, on the large
issue of assessing backlash, Klarman demonstrates an admirable ability to
capture this messiness. In fact, this is a significant way in which the book
compares favorably with Klarman's own earlier work on same-sex marriage
50. Id at 192; cf id. at 189 (arguing that these weddings "early in 2004 generated at least as
much backlash against gay marriage as had Goodridge itself').
51. Id. at 192.
52. Id. at 175.
53. Id. at 73.
54. Id. at 175-76.
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and backlash. In a 2005 article, he compared Brown," Lawrence,56 and
Goodridge" as he explored what causes antijudicial backlash. There, he
offered up discrete criteria for predicting backlash and made stronger, more
categorical pronouncements about the negative effects of launching litigation
before public opinion is sufficiently supportive.5 9  His proffered criteria
looked to whether a court ruling made an issue more salient, generated anger
over "outsider interference" or "judicial activism," and pursued social change
in a different order than what majoritarian institutions would do.60 He argued
in 2005 that Goodridge fit these criteria, as did the Supreme Court's decision
in Lawrence, which became more controversial than might otherwise have
been the case because its invalidation of sodomy laws was assessed as part of
the ongoing controversy about marriage. 6' His conclusion in the article was
summed up as: "By outpacing public opinion on issues of social reform, such
rulings mobilize opponents, undercut moderates, and retard the cause they
purport to advance." 62  In the course of this argument, he attributed to
Goodridge several consequences that undermined LGBT interests-not only
the enactment of many anti-same-sex-marriage measures, but possibly
delivering the 2004 election to George Bush; providing the margin of
difference to several Republican Senate candidates in close races and thus
making it more difficult for LGBT-supportive Democrats to block the
appointment of conservative federal judges; and giving cultural conservatives
an enduring political issue to use to great effect. 63
Although Klarman covers much of the same ground in the book and
alludes to the same factors in explaining the backlash, there is a noticeable
change of tone and conclusion from the earlier article. In the book, Klarman
is much less committed to a negative assessment of litigating for same-sex
marriage at a time when public opinion was not supportive. Indeed, having
explored both the costs and benefits of litigation, he concludes in the book
that, "[o]n balance, litigation has probably advanced the cause of gay
marriage more than it has retarded it."64 And, to a much greater degree than
he did in his earlier work, Klarman recognizes that "[I]itigation put gay
marriage on the table," and that, had early litigation not made marriage
55. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
57. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
58. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431 (2005).
59. Id. at 473.
60. Id.
61. See id at 459-73 (discussing backlash against Goodridge); see also id. at 459 (connecting
adverse reaction to Lawrence to the marriage debate).
62. Id. at 482.
63. Id. at 459-73.
64. KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 218. Here, he lists the costs as impeding progress on other gay-
rights priorities, causing Senate candidates to lose reelection and state judges to lose their positions,
and perhaps affecting the outcome of the 2004 election, which in turn led to a more conservative
court. Id. at 218-19.
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salient, it is "unlikely that more than 50 percent of Americans would support
gay marriage in 2012."6 To his credit, Klarman notes expressly in the book
that some of his views have changed. 6 Klarman is not alone in having
perspectives on the marriage controversy that have "evolved,"67 and I think
his candor about it is admirable. Indeed, the fact that the marriage debate has
moved so quickly, and public support for marriage equality risen so rapidly,
has created a challenge for scholars analyzing the debate in real time. At a
minimum, the fast pace of change means that it is wise for anyone studying
the issues to revisit and reassess, rather than clinging to earlier expressed
opinions.
The more ambivalent assessment he offers in the book strikes me as on
much more solid ground than the earlier writing. I have argued elsewhere
that approaches to backlash that make categorical assumptions about the
involvement of courts in contested policy issues can be both too generalized
(in positing that court decisions will reliably generate backlash under a
relatively general set of circumstances)68 and too particularized (in treating
backlash against courts as different in kind from other kinds of political
backlash). Moreover, the idea of backlash itself must be disaggregated. As
we see in the context of the marriage debate, the widespread policy backlash
reflected in DOMA and scores of anti-marriage-equality measures in the
states was not accompanied by a similar public opinion backlash. To the
contrary, favorable opinion has grown sharply over time.70 As we think
about the role of courts, then, it is crucial to remember that the Hawaii courts
started the debate at a time when the issue of same-sex marriage was
nowhere near the political or cultural radar.' Courts entered the marriage
debate years before any majoritarian institution would have. It would be
erroneous to say that courts therefore "caused" the skyrocketing public
support for marriage equality over the last several years, but it is fair to say
that courts crucially ignited a movement that otherwise looked to be years
away. Decisions like Goodridge and those in the next few states that adopted
same-sex marriage as a result of a court decision are, moreover, responsible
for another effect: the reality, as opposed to the frightening possibility, of
married same-sex couples. What has the effect of that reality been? It seems
safe to say that it has not had the same effect on all observers, but it is
reasonable to hypothesize that it has increased public support because those
marriages have simply not had the kind of palpable and catastrophic social
effects that some opponents had predicted.
65. Id. at 208.
66. Id, at 223.
67. Cf id. at 196 (noting that Barack Obama had said several times that his views on same-sex
marriage were "evolving").
68. Schacter, Politics ofBacklash, supra note 22, at 1217.
69. Id. at 1218.
70. Id. at 1219-23.
71. Id. at 1220.
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The central point here is that it is very difficult to draw clean causal
arrows from point A to point B when exploring something as complex as the
same-sex-marriage debate, which has involved multiple institutions (courts,
legislatures, direct democracy, and electoral politics), multiple venues (local,
state, and federal), and multiple domains (cultural, political, and social). The
challenges of mapping actions to consequences in such circumstances lie at
the heart of a book committed to better understanding the dynamics of
antijudicial backlash, yet those challenges are formidably difficult. For the
most part, Klarman skillfully acknowledges the complexity and the
ambiguous picture of simultaneous progress and retrenchment for supporters
of marriage equality. At points, as he enumerates the adverse developments
for the LGBT community following Baehr and Goodridge, one is left with a
vague sense that he would like to return to the more critical stance he took in
2005 toward early litigation. But his conclusions at the end of the book are
more balanced and nuanced, and ultimately more persuasive, than was his
earlier analysis.
Are there larger lessons here for the way scholars think about
constitutional law and theory? My answer is: on some points, yes; on others,
maybe. The way the marriage debate has unfolded can be read to suggest
that we take a fresh look at some staples of constitutional law. But on some
points, there are reasons to wonder if the marriage debate is too idiosyncratic
to warrant much generalization.
First, as I have suggested above, the marriage debate illustrates the
perils of reductionism in explaining cause and effect in the context of court
decisions. Too often, debates about the consequences of controversial
constitutional cases devolve into misleading questions about whether courts
"can" or "cannot" produce meaningful social change. Take Gerald
Rosenberg's well known book, The Hollow Hope,72 in which he pitted the
romantic myth of a "Dynamic Court" (one able and willing to pursue needed
change even when elected officials won't) against his revisionist reality of
the "Constrained Court" (one unable to do so). 73 Though controversial in
some of its particulars, the book is a leading work on litigation as a means of
social change. In 2008, Rosenberg published a second edition of The Hollow
Hope that incorporated the same-sex marriage debate into his analysis.74 The
original edition of Rosenberg's book in 1991 emphasized Brown v. Board of
Educations and Roe v. Wade,7 arguing that observers misattribute to those
decisions (and others) more impact than they actually had, and that changes
72. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991).
73. Id. at 10-27.
74. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter ROSENBERG 2008].
75. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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brought about by political institutions are both necessary to achieve lasting
change, and less likely to backfire.n In his second edition, Rosenberg
ardently defended this same view about same-sex marriage litigation:
Ultimately, the use of litigation to win the right to same-sex marriage
lends further support to the argument that courts are severely limited
in their capacity to further the interests of the relatively
disadvantaged .... By litigating when they did, proponents of same
sex marriage moved too far and too fast ahead of the curve, leaping
beyond what the American public could bear. The lesson here is a
simple one: those who rely on the courts absent significant public and
political support will fail to achieve meaningful social change, and
may set their cause back.
In support of this conclusion, Rosenberg relied on the fact that, as of the
time he wrote, full marriage equality had not migrated beyond
Massachusetts.79 He also considered the case for several possible "indirect"
benefits of litigation, but rejected most of them.80 He concluded, for exam-
ple, that there was more media coverage of same-sex marriage as a result of
litigation, but that much of it was negative; that there had been no rise in
contributions to gay rights groups that could be attributed to the marriage
litigation; and that, on his reading, public opinion about same-sex marriage
had not changed substantially between 1992-2006."
Rosenberg's work has been influential and is impressive in many ways,
but he seems far too committed to the purity of his institutional claim to
acknowledge the complexity and ultimate ambiguity of the dynamics in play.
I have argued elsewhere that Rosenberg's approach to courts fails to
appreciate the murkiness of what might constitute social change.82 I have
argued, as well, that when applied in the area of LGBT rights, his approach
fails to account for significant instances in which judicial action supporting
equality has escaped backlash, and the actions of politically accountable
institutions have provoked it. Examples, among others, are the successful
litigation to secure adoptive rights for same-sex partners in nearly half the
states in the country (producing no backlash), and newly elected President
Bill Clinton's attempt to open the military to gays in 1993 (producing strong
backlash).8 4
The marriage debate strongly suggests the need for a less dogmatic,
more pragmatic approach--one that recognizes the ways in which judicial
77. ROSENBERG, supra note 72, at 107-56, 228-46.
78. ROSENBERG 2008, supra note 74, at 419.
79. Id. at 353-54.
80. Id. at 355-419.
81. Id. at 360-61, 382-407.
82. Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 54 DRAKE L. REV.
861, 868 (2006) [hereinafter Schacter, Social Change].
83. Id. at 875-78.
84. Schacter, Politics ofBacklash, supra note 22, at 1218-19.
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action can generate both progress and backlash at the same time. Indeed, one
takeaway from Klarman's book is that how one judges the wisdom of
beginning a battle in court can depend critically on when the judging takes
place. The aftermath of litigation can look very different based on when it is
assessed. The time that elapsed between the Baehr decision in 1993 and
Goodridge in 2003 would support a fairly bleak assessment. Most of the
activity had been in the form of anti-equality, backlash measures on the
federal and state level. 85 In the pursuit of marriage equality, only the
Vermont Supreme Court's 1999 decision leading to civil unions marked any
significant progress during this time and, of course, by today's standards, it
looks fairly retrograde. While Goodridge marked a stunning victory, it was
quickly followed by another round of state ballot measures designed to head
off Goodridge-clone rulings in other states.8 With the marriage issue
achieving new salience in the 2004 election, anxieties about backlash were
perhaps at their peak. Indeed, it was in the wake of this election that
Klarman, in his 2005 article, seemed to come down more on the Rosenberg
side of the ledger.
Looked at from 2012, though, the picture is dramatically different.
Indeed, Rosenberg himself said in his second edition that his analysis might
be "overtaken by events."88 And so it seems to have been. It is instructive to
consider what happened between 2007 (the last year for which Rosenberg
reported new developments) 89 and February 2012 (the end of the period
addressed at all by Klarman).90 These events alone might explain why
Klarman is, justifiably, more restrained in his critique of litigation than is
Rosenberg. Eight states plus the District of Columbia adopted full marriage
equality, some by judicial action, others by legislative action. These were
Connecticut (2008), California (2008), Iowa (2009), Vermont (2009), New
Hampshire (2010), District of Columbia (2010), New York (2011), Maryland
(2012), and Washington (2012).9' Even though the California state supreme
court's ruling was wiped out by Prop 8 later in 2008,92 and the legislative
actions by both Maryland and Washington were put to voter referenda later
85. See KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 57-68 (recounting federal and state legislation after Baehr
limiting recognition of gay marriages and defining marriage as between a man and a woman).
86. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
87. KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 105.
88. ROSENBERG 2008, supra note 74, at 341.
89. Id. at 351.
90. Klarman's last historical chapter ends in 2011, but his conclusion addresses some develop-
ments in early 2012. KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 223.
91. Connecticut, California, and Iowa legalized same-sex marriage by judicial action. Vermont,
New Hampshire, the District of Columbia, New York, Maryland, and Washington did so by
legislative action. For details, see States, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/
states/ (last updated Nov. 8, 2012) and Relationship Recognition for Same-Sex Couples in the US.,
NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issuejmaps/
relrecog_ 1l_7_12__color.pdf (last updated Nov. 7, 2012).
92. California, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/entry/c/california.
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in 2012, the eruption of marriage equality in several different parts of the
country in this time period is quite striking. In addition to states moving to
marriage equality, four states began to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in other states;94 four states adopted comprehensive civil unions;95
and three states adopted limited relationship protections for same-sex
couples.96
There was, to be sure, some further retrenchment between 2007 and
February 2012. In addition to the enactment of Prop 8, both Arizona and
Florida passed anti-same-sex-marriage amendments in 2008." But even
taking account of these, the national map on relationship recognition for
same-sex couples came to look vastly different between the Rosenberg
second edition and the Klarman book. Also conspicuously "overtaken" was
Rosenberg's claim that public opinion on marriage had not changed much
since 1992. That claim was questionable even as of 2007,98 but by the time
of Klarman's book, it simply fell outside any range of plausibility.
The trend continues, moreover, for the picture has changed substantially
even since the end of the period covered by Klarman. Consider a few data
points. Not unreasonably, Klarman rated it unlikely that President Obama
would announce support for same-sex marriage before the election," yet the
President did exactly that in May 2012.100 In addition, for the first time,
supporters of marriage equality prevailed at the ballot box on Election Day
2012, as measures in four states that opposed marriage equality were all
rejected by voters.10 ' True, an anti-marriage amendment had carried in North
Carolina by a large margin in June 2012,102 but the Election Day four-state
sweep reflected major change and might one day be seen as a tipping point.
93. Frank Bruni, A Big Test for Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2012, 8:36 PM), http://
bruni.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/a-big-test-for-gay-marriage/.
94. These were Rhode Island, Maryland, New Mexico, and Illinois. Relationship Recognition
for Same-Sex Couples in the US., supra note 9 1.
95. These were Washington, Nevada, Illinois, and Delaware. Id.
96. These were Colorado, Maryland, and Wisconsin. Id.
97. Arizona, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http:/www.freedomtomarry.org/states/entry/c/arizona; Flor-
ida, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/entry/c/florida.
98. Schacter, Politics ofBacklash, supra note 22, at 1193-94.
99. KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 223.
100. Noam Cohen, The Breakfast Meeting: Obama Stops 'Evolving' on Same-Sex Marriage,
MEDIA DECODER, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2012, 8:56 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/05/10/the-breakfast-meeting-obama-stops-evolving-on-same-sex-
marriage/?ref-samesexmarriage.
101. Stuart Elliott, After Success on Same-Sex Marriage, Gay Rights Group Uses Ad to Keep
Pressure On, MEDIA DECODER, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2012, 5:59 PM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/l1/25/after-success-on-same-sex-marriage-gay-rights-
group-uses-ad-to-keep-pressure-on/.
102. Bruni, supra note 93.
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And the upward trend in public support for same-sex marriage is, if anything,
seemingly accelerating.03
What has followed litigation in Baehr and Goodridge, then, is both
dramatic retrenchment and dramatic progress. At the very least, this
ambiguous picture challenges any simple faceoff like the one Rosenberg
posits between a romantic and a revisionist notion of courts. It suggests that
it was neither a brilliant tactic nor a grave mistake that the campaign for
marriage equality began with litigation. In showing that judicial decisions
can both further and undermine social change, and can do these two things
simultaneously, one point comes across clearly: courts rarely act in a
vacuum. What courts do is necessarily mediated and communicated through
politics, social movements, media, popular culture, and any number of other
forces. How those forces interact, and the trajectory that interaction creates
for the social change sought, is likely to be complex and deeply contextual,
and to defy easy mapping. It also cannot necessarily be predicted in advance
by those who see litigation as all virtue or all vice. Finally, the trajectory will
not be the same for all. Consider the regional and cultural differences that
have long characterized the marriage debate and help to explain why
marriage equality has come to some states far sooner than others and,
conversely, why some states have been more prone to backlash than
others. 0
A second point driven home by the marriage debate is that academic
inquiries about the capacity of courts to generate social change have often
been excessively focused on the United States Supreme Court. Brown and
Roe are canonical examples, but they are not the only ones. 05 As the
marriage debate now moves to the Supreme Court, perhaps the names Perry
and Windsor may be added to that pantheon. But the virtue of Klarman's
book (and other studies of same-sex marriage) being published before the
Court issues any pronouncements on the issue is that it chronicles the two
decades of judicial developments, overwhelmingly in state courts, that
preceded the Court's entry. This was by the express design of LGBT-rights
litigators, who elected to stay out of federal court for nearly twenty years.
True, Lawrence was decided only a few months before Goodridge, and
several of the justices' opinions gestured in some way toward same-sex
103. For one 2012 poll with dramatic results, see Neil King Jr., WSJI/NBC Poll: Majority Now
Backs Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2012, 12:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/
2012/12/13/wsjnbc-poll-majority-now-backs-gay-marriagel (showing the NBC/Wall Street Journal
poll reflecting a twenty-one point rise in support since 2004).
104. For example, Virginia, Texas, and Utah each passed three separate anti-marriage-equality
measures at various points in time. Texas, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://
www.freedomtomarry.org/states/entry/c/texas; Utah, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.
freedomtomarry.org/states/entry/c/utah; Virginia, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.fteedom
tomarry.org/states/entry/c/virginia.
105. See ROSENBERG 2008, supra note 74, at 292-93, 303-04 (discussing the Supreme Court's




marriage. o0 But the drivers of the debate were Baehr and Goodridge and, to
a lesser extent, some of the state supreme court cases that followed those
crucial firsts. What is missed by an excessive focus on the Supreme Court?
One important point is that this focus offers only one very familiar picture of
the well-known countermajoritarian difficulty.10 7 In that picture, the justices
are appointed with life tenure, and, most of the time, they are reviewing the
actions of elected officials, whether legislative or executive. While Hawaii
and Massachusetts likewise have appointed judges, California and Iowa, for
example, have systems in which judges have to face the voters in some
way. 108 In many states, moreover, the voters have recourse to direct
democracy to enact policy and to counter judicial actions'09 and, of course, in
the Prop 8 case, the marriage ban under review was passed by voters, not by
a legislature. These institutional differences do not eliminate the
countermajoritarian difficulty, but they do recast it in certain ways. The fact
that some judges face voters might, on some views, mitigate the anxieties of
countermajoritarianism."o The fact that voters have enacted laws on same-
sex marriage directly might either exacerbate or mitigate that difficulty,
depending on the normative posture one takes about direct democracy. In
any event, these institutional factors merit notice and study.
The role of state courts in the marriage debate does, however, reflect
one respect in which the marriage cases might be somewhat idiosyncratic.
Unlike many other matters litigated in state courts, this one was nationalized
very quickly."' The Supreme Court did not decide a marriage case between
1993-2012, but as Klarman effectively conveys, the issue nevertheless
commanded the national stage and triggered a debate about judicial activism
comparable to the one triggered by major Supreme Court cases. That owes,
at least in part, to how nationalized the larger debate about LGBT rights
106. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(arguing that Texas's sodomy laws are not supported by a legitimate state interest such as
"preserving traditional marriage"); id at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (warning that the Court's
decision will lead to the "judicial imposition of homosexual marriage").
107. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962) (acknowledging that when the Supreme Court declares a
legislative or executive act unconstitutional, it "thwarts the will of representatives" elected by the
majority). For a historical perspective, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENDCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 258-62 (2009).
108. Methods ofJudicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, http://www.judicialselection.com/
judicial selection/methods/selection of judges.cfn?state=.
109. See State-by-State List of Initiative and Referendum Provisions, INITIATIVE & REFEREN-
DUM INST., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide i%26r.htm (listing twenty-seven states that
allow voters to place measures on the ballot through initiatives and/or referenda).
110. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise ofJudicial Elections and
Judicial Review, 123 HARv. L. REv. 1061, 1129 (2010) (offering a historical perspective on
countermajoritarianism and elected judges).
111. See Schacter, Politics ofBacklash, supra note 22, at 1183-93 (discussing national scope of
debate following the Baehr ruling in 1993).
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already was when the marriage controversy first appeared. It is also related
to the idea that a couple married in one state would seek recognition in
others.l 12 With interstate travel being routine, a similar dynamic might have
some role to play in other contested areas-say, abortion or public benefits-
but the idea of a chain reaction in the realm of marriage has a particularized
purchase of its own.113
Finally, the marriage debate also poses some very fundamental
questions about standard doctrinal approaches to constitutional law. A staple
of federal equal protection and due process review has been the issue of
choosing the appropriate standard of review. This has played out, as well, in
the marriage arena, with virtually all the state courts adopting some version
of the relevant federal constitutional doctrine and attending to the standard of
review. 114 But the state cases, taken as a whole, suggest that this inquiry does
not count for all that much. They are all over the map on standard of review.
For example, cases overturning state marriage statutes have been decided at
every level of equal protection review-rational basis, intermediate, and
strict scrutiny.'15 Similarly, the two circuits that have struck down DOMA
on equal protection grounds employed different levels of review.116 This
variability suggests that all the attention paid to level of review, and all the
thousands of pages written about it in briefs about marriage equality, may
prove to have been mostly a sideshow.
Moreover, significant conceptual problems with one particular aspect of
the scrutiny issue are thrown into high relief in the marriage litigation. One
prong of the analysis traditionally used to decide whether to heighten
scrutiny is an inquiry into whether the group is politically powerless, such
that aggressive judicial review is necessary to protect the group's interest. 17
This issue was, in fact, the subject of extended expert testimony in the federal
court trial on Prop 8's constitutionality.' 18 As I have suggested elsewhere,
issues about the political power or powerlessness of the LGBT community
reveal enigmatic aspects of this part of the doctrine. Among the vexing
questions made salient by the marriage debate are how to measure political
power, how to account for the fact that groups may develop some measure of
political power only because they are subjected to special discrimination in
112. Id. at 1185.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (holding that because a
same-sex marriage prohibition fails a rational basis test the court need not determine whether a strict
scrutiny test is warranted).
115. Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the
Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1363, 1381 (2011).
116. The First Circuit employed a version of rational basis review. Mass. U.S. Dep't of Health,
682 F.3d 1, 10-11 (ist Cir. 2012). The Second Circuit employed intermediate scrutiny. Windsor v.
United States, 699 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted 133 S. Ct. 786 (Dec. 7, 2012).
117. Schacter, supra note 115, at 1372.
118. Id. at 1383.
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the first instance, how to assess a history that includes both political victories
and political defeats, and how to understand the extension of heightened
scrutiny to race- and sex-based classifications notwithstanding the fact that
racial minorities and women have won significant political and legislative
battles." 9
Indeed, the election of 2012 is likely to pose further questions about
what it means for LGBT persons to have or to lack political power. Recall
that supporters of the marriage equality side won on four of four ballot
measures on Election Day (having lost in North Carolina in June of 2012).
Recall, as well, that the President endorsed marriage equality before the
election and paid no obvious political price for doing so. Indeed, the issue
was not raised by his Republican opponent-a stunning contrast to the
election of 2004, in which President Bush used his opposition to marriage
equality as a prominent issue, and Republicans perceived great strategic
advantage in getting the issue on the ballot in thirteen states that year.120
Finally, in 2012, Representative Tammy Baldwin, an openly lesbian
candidate in Wisconsin, was elected to the Senate.121
The events of the 2012 election are likely to be aggressively argued as
evidence of the growing political power of the LGBT community. This will
not and should not resolve the doctrinal question of political powerlessness at
a time when thirty states still have laws banning same-sex couples from
marrying in their constitutions and several other states have statutory bans,122
most states do not include sexual orientation in their antidiscrimination
laws,123 and antigay hate crimes statistics are on the rise.124 But the election
results are likely to complicate the conversation. And that is consistent with
what I take to be a central lesson from the marriage debate and from
Klarman's book: There are no easy institutional answers or lessons here.
Embrace the complexity.
119. See id. at 1390-96 (describing the problems with political process theory in the context of
the marriage debate).
120. Jonathan Capehart, Silence Is Golden on Gay Issues, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2012), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/silence-is-golden-on-gay-
issues/2012/10/21/60427dea-lbaa-Ile2-ba31-3083ca97c314_- blog.html.
121. Michael M. Grynbaum, Fickle Wisconsin Sends a Trusty Progressive to the Senate, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/us/politics/fickle-wisconsin-sends-
tammy-baldwin-to-senate.html?_r-0.
122. Where State Laws Stand, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/
where-state-laws-stand.
123. State Nondiscrimination Laws in the US., NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, http://
www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/nondiscrimination_1_12_color.pdf.
124. Danielle Ryan, Hate Crimes Down in 2011, But Anti-Gay Violence Is Up, FBI Says, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/10/nation/la-na-fbi-hate-crimes-
20121211.
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